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ABSTRACT
Wu, Jianqing Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. Essays on Pricing of Cardinality
Bundles. Major Professors: Karthik Kannan and Mohit Tawarmalani.
This dissertation studies the pricing of cardinality bundles, where firms set prices
that depend only on the size of the purchased bundle, a practice that is increasingly being
adopted by industry. The first essay develops a fast combinatorial technique to obtain the
optimal prices for cardinality bundles. The second essay extend the basic model to solve
the problem when there exists fixed costs or economies of scale. The third essay relax a key
assumption in cardinality bundling literature, which restricts each consumer to purchase no
more than one bundle.
1
1. INTRODUCTION
We study the pricing of cardinality bundles, where firms set prices that depend only on
the size of the purchased bundle. The cardinality bundling (CB) problem we study was
originally proposed by [1] and it involves consumers having a specific preference structure
called Spence-Mirrlees Single Crossing Property (SCP).
In Chapter 2, we show that the optimal prices to the problem can be obtained in
strongly polynomial time. The solution approach we developed is useful in developing an
algorithm to solve the quantity-discount problem proposed by [2].
In Chapter 3, we studies the pricing for cardinality bundles (CB) when bundling
involves complex costs. We first extend the existing CB model to allow fixed costs in adding
additional bundles. We show that CB problem with fixed costs can be solved as a shortest-
path problem. We then extend the CB model in another way to solve CB problem with
submodular cost structure. Such analysis is especially useful when there exists economies
of scale in production.
The existing analytical framework lacks sub-additivity constraints on bundle pric-
ing, which limits its application in reality. In Chapter 4, we solve the CB problem with
additional constraints on bundle prices. We first study the CB problem with marginal de-
creasing prices and prove that it is a shortest-path problem. Second, we propose a dynamic
programming algorithm to solve the CB problem with unit decreasing prices. Third, we
2
analyze the CB problem with sub-additive prices and convert its MINLP formulation to
a mixed-integer programming (MIP) one. Finally, we provide analytical and numerical
analysis on the gaps between different CB models.
3
2. CARDINALITY BUNDLING WITH SPANCE-MIRRLEES
RESERVATION PRICES
2.1 Introduction
Bundling and its benefits have been studied extensively in the literature. For ex-
ample, [3] show that when products are synergistic, offering bundles of products can yield
higher profits than selling them separately. The earliest work on bundling [?, e.g.,]]stigler01,
adams01, mcafee01 focused on mixed bundling, wherein every combination of goods is
sold at a possibly different price. However, because the number of combinations quickly
increases with the number of goods, the pricing problem becomes intractable except for a
small number of goods [4]. So, alternate bundling schemes – such as component pricing,
where only the components are sold; or pure bundling, where only the bundle is sold –
have also been studied and deployed. The focus of this work is to study another bundling
scheme called cardinality bundling or, in short, CB.
In CB, bundles of equal cardinality or size are sold at the same price. That is, for a
firm that sells J goods, consumer may purchase any one good for a listed price, a bundle of
any two goods for a different price, and so on and so forth. In contrast to mixed bundling
(which requires pricing 2J − 1 bundles), CB only requires prices for J bundles. Perhaps
because of the simplicity of the pricing scheme, CB has been adopted in practice. Pricing
4
for theme parks within entertainment complexes such as Disney World are based on CB.
Consumers can purchase multi-day (2, 3, 4 or 5 day) passes and can choose to visit any of
the four theme parks each day. Similarly, Eastlink cable TV allows its consumers to choose
their channel combinations within the cardinality bundles (12 or 20 channels) purchased.
The current literature on CB is relatively sparse and we review it briefly here. Most
relevant to the current paper is [1], where they study the pricing of cardinality bundles
assuming that each consumer is restricted to buy at most one bundle. They explore condi-
tions under which CB can attain the same profit as mixed bundling. Further assuming that
consumers’ reservation price satisfy Spence-Mirrlees Single Crossing Property (SCP), they
propose and analyze a readily computable pricing strategy. [5] also restrict the consumer
to purchase at most one bundle and seek to solve the CB pricing problem as a nonlinear
mixed-integer program. They use Lagrangian relaxation, subgradient ascent, and heuristic
methods to derive bounds for the problem. [6] consider a CB model where unit prices for
bundles decrease with increasing size. They use computations and real data to argue that
profit from their CB model is almost the same as that from mixed bundling.
We begin by considering the model and the proposed pricing strategy of [1] for
cardinality bundles assuming that reservation prices follow SCP. We show that the optimal
prices can be obtained in polynomial time, by solving a linear programming (LP) problem.
In contrast, the techniques proposed in [1] may not generate optimal prices. The LP refor-
mulation provides many insights into cardinality bundling. It paves the way for developing
useful approximation schemes for the continuous case (see [2] and Section 2.3), allows us
to extend our analysis to models with complex cost structures, such as fixed costs for bun-
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dle setup or variable costs with economies of scale (as discussed in Chapter 3), and reveals
valid inequalities that help determine prices that disincentivize consumers from purchasing
more than one bundle .
2.2 CB Discrete Case: Model & Analysis
A customized cardinality bundling strategy models a situation where a vendor offers
a menu of products that may be purchased in a bundle, whose price is determined by its size.
The consumer is free to choose any products as long as the number of goods she chooses
matches the bundle size for which she has paid. This model was originally proposed by [1],
where they assume that the consumers can be ordered such that a consumer of higher type
not only assigns a higher value to bundles of a given size but also derives higher marginal
value from increasing the bundle size. When the consumers can be ordered this way, their
reservation prices are said to satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees Single Crossing Property (SCP).
In this section, we consider the cardinality bundling problem, which is modeled to
optimally choose the sizes and prices of the bundles a vendor should offer in the market.
Our basic model is the same as that in [1] and we review it here for the sake of completeness.
Consider a vendor who sells J products and assume that there are I consumers in the
market. In the following, we denote the bundle of size j as Bundle j. We assume WLOG
that all bundles, 1, . . . , J are offered in the market and the vendor decides their prices.
We denote the price of Bundle j as pj . Obviously, the consumer does not pay anything
for Bundle 0, whose price is therefore fixed at 0. We assume that the cost of the Bundle
j for vendor is cj and that the total cost to the vendor is the sum of the costs for all the
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bundles sold. Clearly, c0 is 0. The model makes a reasonable assumption that a consumer’s
willingness-to-pay (WTP) is non-decreasing with the bundle size,1 which would be trivially
true if extra units can be freely disposed. The model further assumes that each consumer
can purchase at most one bundle.
Let wij ≥ 0 denote the WTP of Consumer i for Bundle j. For every i, we set wi0 to
zero to denote that consumers, who do not purchase anything, do not derive any value out
of the vendor’s products. Since WTPs are non-decreasing with bundle size, wij ≥ wij′ for
j ≥ j′. Since the choice of the bundle rests with the consumer, if Consumer i purchases
Bundle ji, this bundle must maximize her consumer surplus, i.e., ji ∈ arg maxj{wij − pj}.
Let Ji be the set of bundles Consumer i prefers with price vector p. If |Ji| > 1, we assume
that Consumer i purchases a Bundle ji that belongs to arg maxj{pj − cj | j ∈ Ji}, i.e.,
the surplus-maximizing bundle that yields the most profit to the vendor. This assumption
is typical in the literature and is without loss of generality.2
1 [1] imposes WTP for each consumer to be concave in j, which we relax in our model.
2To see this, let J ′(j) = {j′ | pj′ − cj′ < pj − cj} be the set of bundles that provides less profit to vendor
than j. Observe that since the number of consumers and bundles is finite, there exists an ε > 0 such that even
if the price of a bundle that a consumer does not prefer is reduced by Jε, the consumer continues to prefer
the bundles in Ji after the change. Now, consider a new pricing scheme p′, where the price of Bundle j is set
to p′j = pj − |J ′(j)|ε. Then, it is easy to verify that, when the prices are p′, Consumer i prefers the Bundle
ji ∈ arg max{pj − cj | j ∈ Ji} over other bundles in Ji and, since |J ′(j)| < J , this preference is also over
bundles not in Ji. Further, the vendor does not lose more than JIε in the profit when he prices the bundles
using p′ instead of p. Since ε can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, this yields a sequence of solutions for
which vendor’s profit converges to the one obtained under our assumption.
7
Let xij be 1 if Consumer i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} buys Bundle j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , J} and 0











(wij′ − pj′)xij′ ≥ wij − pj ∀i, ∀j (2.1)
J∑
j=0
xij = 1 ∀i (2.2)
p0 = 0 (2.3)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, ∀j. (2.4)
Let (x∗, p∗) be a solution that generates the maximum profit for the vendor. Assuming
(3.2), Constraints (3.1) enforce incentive compatability (IC) and individual rationality (IR)
for Consumer i. The left hand side models the consumer surplus from the purchase deci-
sion and the right hand side models the consumer surplus from the purchase of alternate
bundles. The case with j = 0 ensures that consumer only purchases bundles with non-
negative surplus. Constraints (3.2) enforce that each consumer purchases only one bundle.
Observe that CBP1 is a mixed integer nonlinear program (MINLP) since the price vector
pj and consumer decisions xij are variables and their products appear in the objective and
in Constraint (3.1).
Like in other nonlinear pricing problems, [1] assume that consumer valuations sat-
isfy the Spence-Mirrlees Single Crossing Property (SCP) [?, see]]spence01. We also make
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the same assumption, which imposes the following ordering on the consumers’ WTP for
the bundles:
wij ≥ wi′j ∀i > i′, (2.5)
wij − wij′ ≥ wi′j − wi′j′ ∀i > i′, ∀j > j′. (2.6)
The interpretation of these conditions is straightforward. A consumer with a higher index
has a (weakly) higher WTP for any bundle. Also, the WTP exhibits increasing differ-
ences, i.e., as bundle size increases, the WTP for a higher-indexed consumer increases
more rapidly than the WTP for a lower-indexed consumer. Essentially, this assumption
states that consumers can be ordered by types, with higher type consumers valuing the
products and marginal changes in bundle sizes more than the lower type ones. Before we
develop an efficient solution for this problem, we review the currently available approaches
using examples.
Table 2.1.: Willingness-to-pay for Example 2.2.1
Bundle Consumers’ WTP
size I1 I2 I3 I4
0 0 0 0 0
1 26 36 58 120
2 47 62 91 180
3 58 77 113 221
4 62 83 123 240
Example 2.2.1 Consider a scenario with I = 4 consumers, J = 4 bundle sizes, and costs
cj = 0 for all j. Suppose the WTP for the consumers are as given in Table 3.1. It can be
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verified easily that they satisfy SCP. We use BARON [7] to solve the MINLP formulation of
CBP1. (Note that BARON guarantees that it finds the global optimal solution at termina-
tion.) The optimal solution thus found is to set p∗1 = p
∗
2 = 47, p
∗
3 = 62, and p
∗
4 = 72. It is
easy to check that, with these prices, Consumer 1, 2, 3, and 4 buy Bundles 2, 3, 4, and 4
respectively. The optimal profit for the vendor is 253.3
We now make a small change to the setting of Example 2.2.1 and illustrate that the
optimal assignment for a consumer depends on the WTP of all other consumers.
Example 2.2.2 In the setting of Example 2.2.1, change w41 from 120 to 100, so that WTPs
still satisfy SCP. If CBP1 is now solved using BARON, the optimal solution assigns Con-
sumer 1 to Bundle 0 yielding a profit of 256.4 There is no optimal allocation that assigns
3Result 3 in [1] claims that the following approach optimally solves CBP1, which we show later isn’t always
the case. Consumer i is assigned to the largest bundle size j that satisfies the following condition:
(I − i+ 1)(wij − wi,j−1)− (I − i)(wi+1,j − wi+1,j−1) ≥ cj − cj−1. (2.7)
We remark that, when Consumer i is assigned a bundle, the WTP of consumers other than i and i + 1 are
ignored. Here, the right hand side is 0 since we assume cj′ = 0 for all 1 ≤ j′ ≤ J . The left hand side values
are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2.: Left hand side values of Equation (2.7)
Bundle LHS values
size I1 I2 I3 I4
0
1 -4 -8 16 120
2 6 12 -14 60
3 -1 1 3 41
4 -2 -2 1 19
For Example 2.2.1, the above approach yields the same solution as the optimal solution found earlier using
BARON.
4The optimal assignment of Consumer 1, 2, 3, and 4 is to Bundles 0, 0, 1, and 4 respectively. The correspond-








Bundle 2 to Consumer 1.5 Any allocation that ignores the WTP of Consumer 4 while allo-
cating bundle to Consumer 1 will thus not yield optimal profit. 6,7
The only available approaches to solve CBP1 use either an MINLP solver or a MIP
solver on a linearization of CBP1 that does not use a global solver on CBP1 directly. The
MINLP-/MIP-based approach is, however, not amenable to comparative statics because
global optimality certificates are typically neither small nor easy to obtain. In this section,
we develop an alternate solution approach that is efficient, guarantees optimality, and is
amenable to comparative statics.
2.2.1 Properties of the Optimal Solution
First, we identify some properties of the optimal solution.8
Proposition 2.2.1 There exists an optimal pricing scheme that is nondecreasing with bun-
dle size.






xi,j′ i = 1, . . . , I − 1, ∀j. (2.8)
That is, there exists an optimal solution where the mapping from consumer types to bundle
sizes is non-decreasing, i.e., for any i < I , if Consumer i buys Bundle j, then Consumer
5In fact, if Consumer 1 is restricted to purchase Bundle 2, the vendor cannot obtain a profit more than 253.
6 [1] claims that it is optimal to assign Consumer 1 to Bundle 2 even in this case. This is so, because for
i = 1, Equation (2.7) is independent of w41. However, as shown above, this is not an optimal assignment.
7In the proof of Result 3, [1] modify the procedure when higher type consumers do not buy larger sized
bundles. This modification does not apply here.
8All the proofs are provided in the appendix.
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i + 1 buys a Bundle j′ such that j′ ≥ j. Further, for any given price vector, there exists a
feasible allocation of bundle sizes to consumer types that is non-decreasing.
Proposition 2.2.3 There exists an optimal pricing scheme such that if two bundle sizes j
and j′ are bought by some consumers and j′ > j then pj′ − cj′ > pj − cj .
Proposition 2.2.4 Among the consumers purchasing a non-zero bundle size, the lowest
indexed one is charged at her WTP in every optimal solution.
Proposition 2.2.2 is particularly interesting, since it provides redundant, yet rather
important, constraints that facilitate the solution of CBP1. Further, Proposition 2.2.2 ap-
plies to other bundling problems where WTPs follow SCP, including those where con-
sumers may purchase more than one bundle [8]. Propositions 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3 imply
that prices are higher for larger-sized bundles purchased; the higher type consumers pur-
chase weakly larger-sized bundles; and the profits also increase with the purchased bundle
sizes.
2.2.2 A Solution Approach
In this section, we refromulate CBP1 so as to develop a solution approach. A key
step in reformulating the problem is that optimal profit satisfies a substructure optimality
condition that is totally unimodular. Then, we show that there exists a simple approach to
solve the dual of the reformulation.
12
Reformulating the MINLP to a 0-1 IP
We first provide some intuition into what makes it possible to solve CBP1 quickly.
First, assume that the vendor fixes a certain bundle size that the first consumer will pur-
chase. Since the first consumer must purchase one of Bundles 0, . . . , J , this yields J + 1
problems for the vendor to solve. The key property that enables the vendor to solve the
problem is that once the first consumer is allocated Bundle j, the remaining problem can
be solved by solving a smaller cardinality bundling problem, i.e., one which has Consumers
2, . . . , I and Bundles j, . . . , J . This subproblem can then be solved recursively using the
same technique. Before we provide a formal proof of our algorithm, we build some intu-
ition into the problem structure.
Consider the cardinality bundling problem where the vendor only considers Con-
sumers i′, . . . , I and prices the bundles so that each of these consumers buys one of the
Bundles j′, . . . , J . To accomplish this, by Proposition 2.2.2, it suffices to restrict i′ to pur-
chase a bundle of size at least j′ and to remove Consumers 1, . . . , i′ − 1. More generally,
assume that the vendor wishes to ensure that i′ buys one of the options from a set of bundle
sizes, say J ′. Then, the corresponding problem can be formulated by adding the constraint,∑
j∈J ′ xi′j = 1, to CBP1. We denote this problem as CBP(i
′, j′ | J ′) and the correspond-
ing optimal profit as ΠCBP(i′,j′|J ′). Obviously, ΠCBP(i′,j′|{j′,...,J}) = maxj≥j′ ΠCBP(i
′,j′|{j}).9
Therefore, it suffices to find a way to solve CBP(i′, j′ | {j′}), whose solution can in turn
be obtained by solving CBP(i′ + 1, j′ | {j′, . . . , J}). As it turns out, this is because the
9Further, by Proposition 2.2.2, ΠCBP(i
′,j′|{j}) = ΠCBP(i
′,j|{j}) because if i purchases j, then every higher
type consumer purchases a bundle j or, higher and j ≥ j′.
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purchasing decision of Consumers i′ + 1, . . . , I are the same in the two problems. If we
denote the set {j′, . . . , J} as j′≥:
ΠCBP(i
′,j′|{j′}) = ΠCBP(i
′+1,j′|j′≥) + (wi′j′ − cj′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sale of j′ to i′
+ (I − i′)(wi′+1j′ − wi′j′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
restrictions on prices
. (2.9)
The first adjustment is because of the revenue and cost from selling j′ to i′ and the second is
because the price of Bundle j′ is constrained to the WTP of Consumer i′ in CBP(i′, j′ | {j′})
whereas it is constrained to the WTP of Consumer i′+1 in CBP(i′ + 1, j′ | j′≥). In order to
make the result also apply to the case when i′ = I , we define wI+1j = wIj . To capture this
difference succinctly, we let vi′j′ denote wi′j′ − (I − i′)(wi′+1j′ − wi′j′) and rewrite (2.9)
as: ΠCBP(i′,j′|{j′}) = ΠCBP(i
′+1,j′|j′≥) + (vi′j′ − cj′).
Now, we formally show that the cardinality bundling problem can be linearized into
a 0-1 integer program using the above notation.








∣∣∣∣∣ (3.2), (3.4), (3.7)
}
.
Let x∗ be an optimal solution to CBP2. Let {i0, . . . , ik} be the lowest type consumers that

























j=0 vijxij captures the
total revenue for any feasible xij . Thus, vij is the incremental revenue from selling Bundle
j to Consumer i.
We return to the setting of Example 2.2.2 to illustrate the application of Proposi-
tion 2.2.5 and compute the maximum profit for the vendor in this case. Table 2.3 shows vij
values for Example 2.2.2. So, to compute the profit, the appropriate vij values are summed
up. For example, if a vendor tries to serve Consumers 1, 2, 3, 4 with Bundles 1, 2, 3, 4
respectively, then the total vendor profit is v11 + v22 + v33 + v44 = 245. The maximum
profit is the summation of vij that yields the maximum value and is such that xij satisfy
Constraints (3.2), (3.4), and (3.7). In particular, this implies that the only admissible strate-
gies are such that higher type consumers are served larger-sized bundles. In this case, the
maximum profit evaluates to v1,0 + v2,0 + v3,1 + v4,4 = 256.
Table 2.3.: Computing vij for Example 2.2.2
Bundle vij
size I1 I2 I3 I4
0 0 0 0 0
1 -4 -8 16 100
2 2 4 2 180
3 1 5 5 221
4 -1 3 6 240
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In fact, CBP2 can be solved without the binary restrictions (3.4) because its con-
straint matrix is totally unimodular.
Proposition 2.2.6 The constraint matrix of CBP2 is totally unimodular.
Since the constraint matrix of CBP2 is totally unimodular, we can relax its binary
restrictions.
Linear Program
Next, we reformulate CBP2 as a linear program (LP).




j′=j xij′ , where xI+1,j,∀j 6= J is understood








s.t. aij − ai,j+1 + xij − xi+1,j = 0 ∀(i, j) 6= (I, J) (2.11)
aIJ + xIJ = 1 (2.12)
aiJ+1 = 0 ∀i (2.13)
aij ≥ 0; xij ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀j. (2.14)
Recall that the original cardinality bundling problem appeared to be an MINLP problem,
which has now been transformed into an LP, CBP2a. Therefore, we are now able to draw
upon the general comparative static results from the LP literature and apply them to the
CBP context to generate managerial insights. In the following subsection, we develop a
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few related insights. However, before we proceed, we formally show next that CBP2a can
be solved “fast.”




s.t. lij ≥ lij−1 i = 0, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , J (2.15)
lij ≥ li−1j + vij − cj i = 1, . . . , I; j = 0, . . . , J (2.16)
l00 = 0.
2.2.3 Comparative Statics
Invoking the sensitivity results from LP, we can infer that the vendor profit is con-
cave in cj and convex in vij [?, Theorem 5.3 in ]]btt97. In the following paragraphs, we
consider some additional comparative static results.
Consider the cost parameters first. We say that for any two cost vectors c′ and c′′,
the marginal cost of c′ is less than that of c′′ if for all j ≥ 1, c′j − c′j−1 ≤ c′′j − c′′j−1. We say
the marginal cost is strictly less if the inequality is strict. Although the solution approach
of [1] is inadequate, their insight regarding the weak reduction in the size of cardinality
bundles with increasing marginal cost still holds.
Corollary 2.2.4 Assume that marginal cost of c′ is less than that of c′′. Then, for every
optimal allocation x′ with c′ there exists an optimal allocation s with c′′ such that each
consumer is allocated a bundle of weakly smaller size in s than in x′. Similarly, for every
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optimal allocation x′′ with c′′ there exists an optimal allocation t with c′ such that each
consumer is allocated a bundle of weakly larger size in t than in x′′. If the marginal cost of
c′ is strictly less than that of c′′ then every optimal allocation x′ with c′ allocates a bundle
of size no smaller than any optimal allocation x′′ with c′′.
Next, we study how changes to consumers’ WTP affect the solution (e.g., when
the vendor pursues advertising efforts). Since CBP2d is convex in vij and vij is a linear
transformation ofwij , CBP2d is convex in WTP [?, Theorem 3.2.2 in ]]bv04, and therefore,
so it is in CBP2. Notice, when WTPs do not satisfy SCP, CBP2 may not be convex in the
WTPs.10
Increasing WTP (even if it is subject to SCP) does not guarantee an increase in ven-
dor profit. From Examples 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, it should be clear that increasing the consumers’
WTP can decrease the profit. However, increasing consumers’ WTP (of course, subject to
SCP) on the purchased bundles will always increase vendor profits. So, it is important for
the vendors to target the WTP increases.
10In the following example, we illustrate that when WTPs do not satisfy SCP, CBP2 may not be convex in
the WTPs. Consider a scenario with I = 2 consumers, J = 3 bundle sizes, and costs cj = 0 for all j.
Suppose W1 is one WTP matrix as given in the second and third columns of Table 2.4 and W2 is another
WTP matrix as given in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 2.4. Notice, the WTP of Consumer 1 inW2 is
the same as that of Consumer 2 inW1 and the WTP of Consumer 2 inW2 is the same as that of Consumer
1 in W1. The optimal solutions for both problems are p∗1 = p∗2 = 12, p∗3 = 34 and the optimal profits are
Π∗1 = Π
∗
2 = 46. LetW3 = 12W1 +
1
2W2, as shown in the last two columns in Table 2.4. The optimal solution




3 = 26 and the optimal profit is Π
∗










Bundle W1 W2 W3







1 10 16 16 10 13 13
2 12 18 18 12 15 15
3 12 40 40 12 26 26
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Next, consider the scenario when the vendor cannot increase the WTPs but can
only shift the WTP from one consumer type to the other (for example, vendor pursues
homogenization efforts). We first study the profit implications in the context of information
goods, where cj = 0 ∀j. Letw denote a given I×J WTP matrix. Definew′ =W(i1, i2, w)
as a function which maps w to another I × J matrix w′, such that, for any j,
w′ij =






wi′j if i1 ≤ i ≤ i2.
That is, consumers indexed between i1 and i2 are homogenized so that their individual
WTPs in the transformed setting is the average of their original WTPs; whereas the other
consumers remain unaffected. Let Π∗CBP (w) denote the optimal profit of a CBP problem
for a given w WTP matrix.
Proposition 2.2.8 When cj = 0, for each i′, Π∗CBP (W(i′, I, w)) ≥ Π∗CBP (w).
Proposition 2.2.8 shows that homogenizing improves the vendor profit only if it involves
the highest consumer type.11 A corollary is that homogenizing across all consumer types
11We illustrate that merging may decrease the vendor profit when the highest consumer types are not involved
by using the following example.
Table 2.5.: Willingness-to-pay
Bundle WTP
size I1 I2 I3
1 2 10 13
2 4 12 20
Consider a scenario with I = 3 consumers, J = 2 bundle sizes, and costs cj = 0 for all j. Suppose the WTP
for the consumers are as given in Table 2.5. Obviously, the optimal solution is p∗1 = 10, p
∗
2 = 17 and the
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(i.e., using W(1, I, w) as WTP) will weakly increase the profit. Notice that, if costs are
non-zero, even when the highest consumer type is included for homogenization, the vendor
profit can decrease.12
Apart from the comparative static results, we were also interested in exploring the
relationship between vij and wij terms. In doing so, we discovered a result that may
be tangential to the analysis thusfar but useful (for computational purposes) in quickly
generating example values of WTPs satisfying SCP. As mentioned before, given WTPs,






(I − i′ − 1)wij −
I∑
i′=i+1








This shows that there is a one-to-one linear transformation relating w to v. Given the
relationship, we show next that we may choose v arbitrarily for the first I − 1 consumers
and still find WTPs that satisfy SCP and are increasing in j.
Proposition 2.2.9 Given vij for i ∈ {1, . . . , I − 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, there exist wij for
i ∈ {1, . . . , I} amd j ∈ {0, . . . , J} that satisfy SCP and are increasing in j.
optimal profit is 27. If we merge Consumer 1 and 2, then w′11 = w
′




22 = 8, which leads to a
new optimal solution of p′∗1 = 6, p
′∗
2 = 13 and a lower optimal profit of 25.
12Consider a scenario with I = 2, J = 1, and costs c1 = 10. Suppose w11 = 4 and w21 = 20. the optimal





which leads to a new optimal solution of p′∗1 = 12 and a lower optimal profit of 4.
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2.3 Continuous Case: Model and Analysis
We now investigate a continuous version of the problem treated in Section 3.2. One
application of the continuous problem is in quantity discount pricing, which was explored
by [2].13 The continuous version can also be applied in cardinality bundling, when the
goods are not discrete. For example, many restaurants charge based on weight (for e.g.,
kilos in Brazil) regardless of the kind of food chosen by the consumer on their plate. The
main difference is that bundle sizes are not restricted to integer values 1, . . . , J but can take
any real value. The problem for the vendor is then to identify the optimal pricing function
for all real-valued sizes, which turns out to be significantly more difficult. Nevertheless, we
show that the new insights developed in Section 3.2 can be used to approach this problem.
2.3.1 Prior Related Work
The model here is similar to that in the previous section except that we use a con-
tinuous variable y ∈ R+ to represent the bundle sizes, instead of using an index j to denote
discrete sizes. Every variable that had an index j before now becomes a function of y in-
stead. In particular: p(y) represents the price of bundle size y; c(y) the cost of Bundle y;
wi(y) the Consumer i’s WTP for bundle size y. We also define yi to denote the bundle size
Consumer i purchases and corresponds to j(i) =
∑J
j=0 jxij in the discrete case. [2] also
assumes WTPs satisfy SCP and models it as w′i(y) < w
′
i+1(y) for all y. We relax these con-
13The discrete case analyzed in [1] was heavily inspired by [2].
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ditions slightly to the weak inequality and generalize them to the non-differentiable case as
follows:14
0 = wi(0) ≤ wi(y) ≤ wi+1(y) ∀y (2.18)
wi(y + d)− wi(y) ≤ wi+1(y + d)− wi+1(y) ∀y ∀d ≥ 0. (2.19)






s.t. wi(yi)− p(yi) ≥ wi(y)− p(y) ∀i ∀y. (2.20)
We first review the approach suggested in [2]. Assuming that WTPs satisfy SCP
conditions with a strict inequality, he shows that every optimal solution must satisfy yi+1 ≥
yi for all i < I−1. Then, given yi, i = 1, . . . , I , he substitutes the optimal prices, obtaining
the optimization problem in the space of y variables. Then, the paper ignores the constraints
yi+1 ≥ yi to obtain an unconstrained optimization problem and sets its derivative to zero,
yielding the following local optimality condition:
(I − i+ 1)w′i(yi)− (I − i)w′i+1(yi) = c′(yi). (2.21)








′)dy′ for all y and d, which
in turn implies that wi(y + d) − wi(y) ≤ wi+1(y + d) − wi+1(y) for all y and d. On the other hand,
wi+1(y+d)−wi+1(y) ≥ wi(y+d)−wi(y) implies that limd→0 wi+1(y+d)−wi+1(y)d ≥ limd→0
wi(y+d)−wi(y)
d
or that w′i+1(y) ≥ w′i(y).
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We now interpret the approach of [2] using our results in Section 3.2. Assume that
the optimal bundle sizes the consumers buy are given by y∗i , i = 1, . . . , I . Then, CBPc1
restricted to these bundle sizes reduces to a discrete problem. Since y∗i , i = 1, . . . , I must be
optimal to this restricted problem, the results of our previous section still apply. Therefore,
with the slightly relaxed SCP conditions (2.18) and (2.19), the results of [2] still hold. In
particular, Proposition 2.2.2 shows that there exists an optimal solution with y∗i+1 ≥ y∗i for






s.t. yi+1 ≥ yi 1 ≤ i ≤ I − 1, (2.22)
where vi(yi) = wi(yi) − (I − i)(wi+1(y) − wi(y)) and wI+1(y) is assumed to be wI(y).
Then, Equation (2.21) is the same as setting the derivative of the objective of CBPcy to
zero, i.e., v′i(yi) = c
′(yi).15
Solving (2.21) may not seem hard since each consumer’s decision is independent of
others. However, this approach only works if Constraints (2.22) are automatically satisfied
by the solution. Otherwise, the optimality conditions do not decompose. Once the optimal
Lagrangian multipliers are known, the remaining optimality conditions (those of the inner
problem of the Lagrangian dual) can still be decomposed. However, for a given i, the La-
grangian multiplier of yi+1 ≥ yi gets multiplied with the decision of both Consumers i and
15More generally, when v and c are not necessarily differentiable, then the above optimality condition gener-
alizes to zero belonging to the subdifferential of vi(yi)− c(yi).
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i + 1. Therefore, the problem of determining the optimal multipliers links the consumers
together.
Besides Constraints (2.22) being ignored in the optimality conditions, there is an-
other subtle issue with [2]’s approach. The optimality condition in (2.21) is a local opti-
mality condition, which would be reasonable, if the objective had a unique local maximum
(for example if it was strictly concave). However, as shown in the next example, vi(·) is
often nonconvex, and there may be many points where the derivative of the objective of
CBPcy is zero.
Example 2.3.1 In CBPc1, assume that consumers can choose any bundle size y, as long
as 0 ≤ y ≤ J , where J is an even number, and let c(y) be identically zero. Let wi(y) =
1 + I
I−i+1(πy + log(1 + y)) − cos(πy) ∀i. Each consumer’s WTP is increasing in y and
the WTPs satisfy SCP. It follows that vi(y) = 1 − cos(πy). Therefore, if yi is even, it






solutions satisfy Condition (2.21). Moreover, let J = 4I − 2, and observe that there are
exponentially many solutions that satisfy Condition (2.21) and satisfy Constraint (2.22). To
see this, consider 2I solutions obtained by allocating bundle sizes in {4(i − 1), 4i − 2} to
Consumer i.
[2] does not mention the fact that there may be many solutions that satisfy Condition (2.21).
There is, thus, no guidance available on selecting the best solution among them. If one ig-
nores Constraint (2.22), this situation can be remedied by selecting, for Consumer i, the
bundle size yi that maximizes vi(y)− ci(y) by solving a one-dimensional global optimiza-
tion problem. However, in the presence of Constraint (2.22), the situation is significantly
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more complex. Thus, the approach based on Condition (2.21) is deficient in that it ignores
Constraint (2.22) and does not provide any way of selecting the global optimal solution
from many possible local optima.
2.3.2 Reformulation and Approximation
We assume that the vendor only provides bundles of size Y or smaller. This as-
sumption is reasonable since the vendor is typically limited by a production capacity. In
other words, we include the constraint 0 ≤ yi ≤ Y for all i in CBPcy. As illustrated in
Section 2.3.1, solving CBPc1 is challenging since it requires the determination of the opti-
mal price function p(y) instead of pricing a discrete set of bundles and has infinitely many
incentive compatability constraints of the type (3.33), one for each y. These issues can be
somewhat sidestepped by reformulating CBPc1 as CBPcy which has finitely many con-
tinuous variables. However, since the resulting functions vi(·) are in general non-convex,
the problem remains challenging to solve, especially in the presence of Constraints (2.22).
First, we remark that it is possible to extend the approach used in formulating
CBP2d to solve the continuous case. In particular, the problem aims to find functions




s.t. li(y) ≥ li−1(y) + vi(y)− c(y) i = 1, . . . , I, 0 ≤ y ≤ Y (2.23)
l0(y) = 0 0 ≤ y ≤ Y (2.24)
li(y) is non-negative and non-decreasing i = 1, . . . , I, 0 ≤ y ≤ Y (2.25)
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The above approach solves the continuous cardinality bundling problem by computing
li(y) = sup{li−1(y′) + vi(y′)− c(y′) | y′ ≤ y} for each i.
We remark that the convex reformulation CBP2 (without the integrality constraints)
for the discrete case does not extend easily to the continuous case. Note that, for CBP2,
the bundle size that Consumer i buys is yi =
∑J





j=0 jxij . However, when xij take continuous values,



















j=0 jxij , where the inequality follows from Con-
straints (3.7). The converse does not hold for continuous values of xij .16 This explains why
CBPcy is not convex although CBP2 is a convex program when the superfluous binary
restrictions are removed.
For a set, S, let conv(S) and projx S denote respectively the convex hull of S and
the projection of S to the space of x variables. Let {kj}Jj=0 ∈ [0, Y ]J+1, where 0 = k0 <
· · · < kJ = Y . Consider y′ ∈ RI , with 0 ≤ y′i ≤ Y for all i that satisfies Constraints (2.22)
and extend y′ to (y′, x′) ∈ RI × RI×J so that
x′ij =

0 if y′i ≤ kj−1 or y′i ≥ kj+1
y′i−kj−1













j=0 jxi+1j , xiJ 6≤ xi+1J .
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kjxi+1j, i = 1, . . . , I − 1
J∑
j=0
xij = 1,∀i; xijxij′ = 0,∀i, j, j′ ≥ j + 2; xij ≥ 0,∀i, j
 ,
(2.27)
and observe that (y′, x′) is the only solution in S that projects to y′. Next, we compute
conv(S).













xi+1j′ ,∀j, i = 1, . . . , I − 1;
J∑
j=0
xij = 1,∀i; xij ≥ 0,∀i, j
 .
(2.28)
Let A = {y | (2.22), 0 ≤ yi ≤ Y, ∀i}. Then, projy S ′ = projy S = A. Further,
conv(projx S) = projx S
′.





































) ∣∣ y ∈ A}, which reduces to CBPcx since the objective only depends
on x.
27
We now show that when wi(·) and c(·) are piecewise linear functions whose break-
points form a subset of {k1, . . . , kJ}, then CBPcx can be solved quickly. First, observe











where the second equality is from (2.26), and the third equality is because it follows from
(2.26) that xij′ = 0 for all j′ 6∈ {j, j + 1}. Similarly c(y) =
∑J
j=0 xijc(kj). We define
wij = wi(kj), cj = c(kj), and vij = wij − (I − i)(wi+1j −wij), where wI+1j is understood








∣∣∣∣∣ x ∈ projx S.
}









∣∣∣∣∣ x ∈ projx S ′
}
.
Thus, we have shown the following result.
Theorem 2.3.3 When wi(·) and c(·) are piecewise linear functions, whose breakpoints
form a subset of {k1, . . . , kJ}, the continuous cardinality bundling problem can be solved
as CBPcxL2.
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Observe that CBPcxL2 is identical to the discrete cardinality bundling problem CBP2 for
which we developed anO(IJ) algorithm in Section 2.2.2. Therefore, it follows from Theo-
rem 2.3.3 that the continuous cardinality bundling problem with piecewise-linear functions
can be solved in O(IJ) time.
Corollary 2.3.4 When wi(·) and c(·) are piecewise linear functions, whose breakpoints
form a subset of {k1, . . . , kJ}, there exists an optimal solution where every consumer pur-
chases a bundle in {k1, . . . , kJ}, i.e., yi ∈ {k1, . . . , kJ} for all i.
Now, we relax the assumption that wi and c are piecewise linear functions and
consider the more general case of Lipschitz continuous functions. Recall that a function
f(x) is said to be Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant Lf on an interval [a, b], if
there is a non-negative constant Lf such that |f(x1)− f(x2)| ≤ Lf |x1 − x2| for all x1, x2
that belong to [a, b]. We assume thatwi(y) and c(y) are Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz
constant β. We will construct piecewise linear approximation for wi(y) (resp. c(y)). Say,
we wish to approximate the solution within ε. Then, we choose k = ε
I(2I+1)β
and J = dY
k
e.














Observe that wki (·) and ck(·) are piecewise linear functions. Let Πc be the optimal value of
CBPcx and Πk denote the optimal profit when wki (y) and c
k(y) are the WTP for Consumer
i and the cost for producing y.
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Theorem 2.3.5 For a given ε, define k = ε
I(2I+1)β
. Then, Πk ≤ Πc ≤ Πk + ε. Further, Πk








Pricing of cardinality bundles has not been widely studied in literature although this
bundling scheme is increasingly being adopted in industry. Our paper provides a compre-
hensive analysis of the problem when the consumer’s willingness to pay satisfies Spence-
Mirrlees condition and consumers are restricted to buy only one bundle. In this paper,
we first study the cardinality bundling problem in the context of discrete bundle sizes, the
problem first considered in [1]. We provide a solution approach that can solve the problem
efficiently. Then we use the underline structures from the discrete problem to revisit the
quantity discount problem proposed in [2] and derive insights and solution approaches.
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3. CARDINALITY BUNDLES WITH COMPLEX COSTS
3.1 Introduction
Cardinality bundling, or, in short, CB, is a kind of bundling strategy where bundles
of equal cardinality or size are sold at the same price. One example of how firms adopt CB
is the way Disney World sells themepark tickets. Consumers can purchase multi-day (2, 3,
4 or 5 day) passes from Disney World. A consumer who purchases a 2-day pass can choose
any two themeparks and enter each one for one day. Similarly, a consumer who purchases
a 3-day pass can choose any three themeparks and enter each one for one day, and so on so
forth. The key characteristic of CB is that the vendor only prices for the cardinality of its
goods and let consumers choose the combination of goods they want under the cardinality.
In fact, CB has been adopted by a variety of firms in practice. For example, Eastlink,
a cable TV service provider in Canada, sells bundles of either 12 channels or 20 channels
and let consumers pick which channels they would like to include in the proposed bundles.
Similarly, Netflix, the online DVD rental firm, prices subscription options based on the
number of DVDs a consumers rents each time.
Actually several other types of bundling have been adopted in practice. The first
one is mixed bundling, wherein every possible combination of goods is sold at a possibly
different price. Mixed bundling is the most profitable bundling strategy. However, [4]
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shows that the pricing problem for mixed bundling is only tractable when the number of
goods is small. Other two types of bundling considered are: component bundling and
pure bundling. In component bundling, individual components, rather than the bundles,
are priced. In pure bundling, only a bundle with all possible products is sold. Pricing for
these two types of bundling is relatively easy. But in most cases, these two strategies do
not guarantee optimal profits. [6] shows that in many cases CB is close to the profitability
of mixed bundling and more profitable than component pricing and pure bundling.
The models presented in this paper extend the CB models in [9]. Before we go into
the details of [9], we first review the literature on CB. [1] is the first analytical modeling
paper which studies the pricing of CB. They build the basic CB model assuming that con-
sumers’ reservation price satisfy Spence-Mirrlees Single Crossing Property (SCP). Their
basic model and the SCP assumption are also used in [9] and this paper. They also explore
the properties of the optimal solution for the CB problem. [5] relax the SCP assumption and
propose a nonlinear mixed-integer programming approach to analyze the CB problem. [6]
use computational and empirical results to show that in many cases, CB is as profitable as
mixed bundling.
[9] solve the basic models of CB problem. They first consider the model presented
in [1] and show that it can be solved as a linear programming (LP) problem within polyno-
mial time. They also consider a continuous version of the CB problem where the vendor
can price bundle sizes at continuous values rather than being restricted to integer values,
same as the quantity discount problem that is explored by [2].
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This paper extends [9] in three ways. First, we show that the basic CB model
in [9] can be reformulated as a shortest-path problem. The network structure underlying
the shortest-path formulation provides many insights into cardinality bundling . Second,
we modify the model to include a fixed costs for the vendor to add an additional bundle and
show that with the fixed costs, the problem can still be solved as a shortest-path problem.
We notice that [5] has a similar setting of including fixed costs. The third extension is to
analyze the CB problem without additively separable cost structure. We prove that even
without additively separable cost structure, if the production cost is submodular, the above
two kinds of problems are still solvable in strong polynomial time. Solutions we developed
here can be implemented to a wide scope of industries where economies of scale exists in
production.
3.2 Basic Model and a Shortest-Path Reformulation
In this section we first review the model and some important results from [9].1 Then
we show that the problem can be reformulated as a shortest-path problem. The shortest-
path structure we develop here not only reveals a simple structure for the CB problem, but
also paves a way to solve more complicated problems in the following sections.
3.2.1 Basic Model
The model is developed from a vendor’s perspective who sells J products to I
consumers in the market. In the following, we denote the bundle of size j as Bundle j.
1Please refer to [9] for a complete version of the mode setup and analyses.
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WLOG, all bundles, 1, . . . , J are assumed to be offered in the market. We denote the price
of Bundle j as pj and the cost of Bundle j as cj . The vendor’s objective is to maximize the
profit, which is calculated as the sum of all prices for all the bundles sold minus the sum
of all the costs for the corresponding bundles. We use Bundle 0 to represent consumers’
choice of not purchasing and set p0 = 0 and c0 = 0.
We denote the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of Consumer i for Bundle j as wij . For
each consumer i, WTP is assumed to be non-decreasing with the bundle size and wi0
is assumed to be zero. Each consumer i is assumed to only purchase one bundle, j ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , J}, that maximizes her surplus calculated as wij − pj . Let xij be 1 if Con-
sumer i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} buys Bundle j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , J} and 0 otherwise. Then, CBP can
be formulated as follows [?, see]]hitt01:
Let xij be 1 if Consumer i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} buys Bundle j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , J} and 0











(wij′ − pj′)xij′ ≥ wij − pj ∀i, ∀j (3.1)
J∑
j=0
xij = 1 ∀i (3.2)
p0 = 0 (3.3)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, ∀j. (3.4)
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Constraints (3.2) represents the assumption that each consumer purchases one bundle. Con-
straints (3.1) requires that consumer surplus from the purchased bundle to be no less than
that from any other alternatives.
Following [9], we assume that consumer valuations satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees
Single Crossing Property (SCP) [?, see]]spence01, stating that consumers can be ordered
by types. Higher type consumers (with higher indexes) are willing to pay more on each
bundle size than lower type consumers (with lower indexes) do, and more for each addition
unit. Thus, we impose the following ordering on the consumers’ WTP for the bundles:
wij ≥ wi′j ∀i > i′, (3.5)
wij − wij′ ≥ wi′j − wi′j′ ∀i > i′, ∀j > j′. (3.6)
In [9], the authors explore a few properties of the optimal solution of CBP1. Next,
we review one of those properties that is especially useful in the extended models which
will be discussed later on. Proposition 4 in [9] states that consumers with higher indexes
always purchase bundle sizes larger than consumers with lower indexes. Thus, we can add






xi,j′ i = 1, . . . , I − 1, ∀j. (3.7)
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Notice, the proof of this proposition still holds even if there are fixed costs in the model
(discussed in Section 3.3) or the costs have a general submodular form (discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4).
3.2.2 A Shortest-Path Reformulation
[9] demonstrates that a solution to CBP1 can be obtained by solving a linear pro-
gramming problem. Next, we show that CBP1 can also be solved as a shortest path prob-
lem.
Following [9], we use the following formulation to linearly transform the WTP
matrix wij to another matrix vij:
vij = wi,j + (I − i)(wi,j − wi+1,j) (3.8)
The way we transformwij to vij plays an important role in developing the solution approach
for CBP1. A detailed discussion on the definition of vij and its implications is provided
in [9]. In short, vij captures that when the vendor allocates Consumer i to purchase Bun-
dle j, how his revenue will change. It combines the gain from the bundle sold and the
loss from vendor’s decremental ability to extract surplus from consumers other than i. by
transforming wij to vij , we are able to reformulate CBP1 to a shortest-path formulation.
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Theorem 3.2.1 CBP1 is equivalent to the following shortest path problem on a graph
which has 2I(J + 1) + 2 nodes and (I + 2)(J + 1) + (I − 1)(J + 1)(J + 2)/2 edges:









χ00j = 1 (3.9)
χ00j = x1j (3.10)
J∑
j=0
χIjJ = 1 (3.11)







χi−1,j′,j = xij ∀i ∀j (3.14)
χijj′ ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∀j ∀j′ ≥ j. (3.15)
The problem formulation in Theorem 3.2.1 can be seen as a shortest-path problem on a
suitable acyclic network. Therefore, one can use a combinatorial algorithm that traverses
the vertices in the order generated by a topological sort and finds the shortest path in linear
time.
Example 3.2.2 Consider a scenario with I = 4 consumers, J = 4 bundle sizes, and costs
cj = 0 for all j. Suppose the WTP for the consumers are as given in Table 3.1. It can be
verified easily that they satisfy SCP. The corresponding vij values are also shown in Table
3.1.
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Table 3.1.: WTP and vij values for Example 3.2.2
Bundle Consumers’ WTP
size I1 I2 I3 I4
0 0 0 0 0
1 26 36 58 100
2 47 62 91 180
3 58 77 113 221
4 62 83 123 240
Bundle vij
size I1 I2 I3 I4
0 0 0 0 0
1 -4 -8 16 100
2 2 4 2 180
3 1 5 5 221
4 -1 3 6 240
We illustrate the shortest-path structure of CBP3 on Example 3.2.2.Figure 3.1 illustrates
the associated network where the source node is the top-left node and the sink node is
the bottom-right node. One unit of flow starts from the source node, travels through the
network, and finally arrives at the sink node. Each edge in the network is directed from
left to right. Observe that, the edges in the network point sideways or downwards, but not
upwards. It is consistent with Proposition 4 in [9], stating that the consumers with higher
indexes purchase weakly larger sized bundles than consumers with lower indexes. The
network has a multipartite structure, each partition corresponding to a consumer. Apart
from the source node and the sink node, there are 2I(J + 1) nodes, with two nodes for
each pair of consumer and bundle size. There are two types of edges in the network, solid
and dotted. The solid edges connect two nodes that correspond to Consumer i purchasing
Bundle j and the dotted edges connect the different partitions of the network. The variable
xij indicates the flow on the solid edge, and χijj′ is the flow on the dotted edge that connects
the end node of the edge with xij flow with the start node of the edge with xi+1,j′ flow. The
per unit cost of flow through the solid edge is −vij + cj whereas there is no cost for the
flow through the dotted edge. In Figure 3.1, there are two numbers shown above each
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solid edge. The number outside the parenthesis is the cost per unit flow on the edge. The
number inside the parenthesis is the shortest distance to this node from the source node. The
actual assignment of consumers to bundles is obtained from the nodes that the shortest path
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Figure 3.1.: The shortest path problem formulation for Example 3.2.2
We remarked earlier that the algorithm for solving the shortest path problem on an
acyclic network takes linear time. Since this network has O(IJ2) edges, a straightforward
implementation takes this much time. However, we can exploit the network structure to
make the algorithm faster. We traverse the nodes, one consumer at a time, from left to
right. For each consumer, we visit the nodes from smallest bundle size to largest bundle
size. For each pair of consumer and bundle sizes, (i, j), there are two nodes, namely the
start and end node of the edge with xij flow. We denote the longest path to the start node
of (i+ 1, j) as lij . Then, define lij = max{lij−1, li−1j + vij − cj}, where l0j is understood
to be zero. These computations take O(IJ) time and solve CBP3. The formulation of this
method is exactly the same as that of CBP2b given in [9].
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3.3 Fixed Costs
In this section, we discuss the CB problem with fixed costs in setting up each bundle
size. Such an extension is particularly important to vendors, such as on-line music stores,
who could provide a huge amount of bundle sizes in the market. In fact, vendors in many
industries will limit the number of bundles they provide to the consumers. For example,
Eastlink only sells bundles of 1 channel, 12 channels, and 20 channels in the market. One
important reason is that setting up and managing each additional bundle size is costly to
the vendor. We notice that the nonlinear mix-integer model developed in [5] has a constant
fixed cost to add each additional bundle size. Next, we modify CBP1 to handle the situation
when the vendor incurs a fixed cost fj if at least one consumer is allocated to Bundle j. All
the other settings and assumptions in CBP1 are not changed.
Let oj be 1 if Bundle j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J} is available in the market and 0 otherwise.











s.t. (3.1), (3.2), (4.2), (3.4)
xij ≤ oj ∀i;∀j (3.16)
oj ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, ∀j. (3.17)
Constraints (3.16) requires Bundle j to be available on the market if it is purchased by
any consumer. The additional item −
∑J
j=0 fjoj in the objective function represents the
deduction in profit due to the fixed costs. Obviously, if fj = 0 ∀j, then CBPf is same as
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CBP1. Interestingly, we can modify the shortest-path formation CBP3 to make it be able
to solve CBPf.
Theorem 3.3.1 CBPf is equivalent to the following shortest path problem on a graph
which has 2I(J + 1) + 2 nodes and (I + 2)(J + 1) + (I − 1)(J + 1)(J + 2)/2 edges:













s.t. (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), (3.15).
Observe that the only difference between CBP3 and CBP3f is that there is an additional






j′=j+1 χijj′fj . The interpretation
of this change is actually straightforward. In any solution of CBP3f, when χijj′ = 1 for
some i, j, and j′ > j, it captures that conditionally on Consumer i is allocated to Bundle j,
Consumer i+ 1 is allocated to a larger size Bundle j′ larger than Bundle j. As a result, the
vendor incurs a fixed cost fj′ to make Bundle j′ available and thus reduces his profit by the
same amount.
We now add fixed costs to Example 3.2.2 to illustrate the underlining shortest-path
structure of CBP3f.
Example 3.3.2 In the setting of Example 3.2.2, add f1 = 2, f2 = 5, f3 = 4, and f4 = 3 as
fixed costs for setting each bundle size accordingly.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the associated network of CBP3f. It is quite similar as the
network of CBP3 shown in Figure 3.1. The only difference is that in Figure 3.1, there is
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x 14 x 24 x 34 x 44
x 13 x 23 x 33 x 43
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x 11 x 21 x 31 x 41
x 10 x 20 x 30 x 40
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Figure 3.2.: The shortest path problem formulation for Example 3.3.2
no cost for any dotted edges, but in Figure 3.2, each downwards dotted edge has a cost for
the flow to go through. Each downwards edge represents that the next consumer purchases
a different bundle size than the one purchased by the the previous consumer, and therefore,
the vendor need to incur a corresponding fixed cost to make this bundle size available.
Notice that the all there is no cost for any sidewards dotted edge, representing that if the
next consumer makes the same purchase decision as the previous consumer, the vendor will
not incur any new fixed cost. Same as CBP3, the shortest path on this graph represents the
optimal solution of CBP3f.
We next show that there exists a fast algorithm to solve CBP3. We next show that
CBP3f can be reformulated to the following CBP3a, and then show that there exists a fast
algorithm to solve the dual of it.
Proposition 3.3.1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I}, ∀j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J}, Let aij = xij, bij =
∑j−1
j′=0 xij′−∑j−1
j′=0 xi+1,j′ , cij =
∑j−1
j′=0 χi−1,j′j, and dij = xi−1,j , where x0j, ∀j and χ0jj′ , ∀j, ∀j′ are
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understood to be 0. Let aI+1,j = bI+1,j = cI+1,j = dI+1,j = 0, ∀j{0, 1, . . . , J + 1}, and
ai,J+1 = bi,J+1 = ci,J+1 = di,J+1 = 0, ∀i{1, 2, . . . , I + 1}. Then, CBP3f is equivalent to
the following CBP3a:
CBP3a : Max











s.t. aij + bij − bi,j+1 − ci+1,j = 0 ∀i, ∀j (3.18)
−ai,j+1 + cij + dij − di+1,j = 0 ∀i, ∀j (3.19)
aIJ + bIJ + cIJ + dIJ = 1 ∀i, ∀j (3.20)
aij ≥ 0; bij ≥ 0; cij ≥ 0; dij ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀j. (3.21)






s.t. l1ij ≥ l1ij−1 i = 0, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , J (3.22)
l1ij ≥ l2ij−1 i = 0, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , J (3.23)
l2ij ≥ l1i−1j + vij − cj − fj i = 1, . . . , I; j = 0, . . . , J (3.24)
l2ij ≥ l2i−1j + vij − cj i = 1, . . . , I; j = 0, . . . , J (3.25)
z ≥ l1IJ (3.26)





3.4 Submodular Cost Function
In this section, we go back to assume there are no fixed costs and focus on another
extension on bundle costs. In [9], the authors solve CB problems with both the discrete
bundle sizes and the continuous bundle sizes. For both cases, the authors assume a separa-
ble cost structure, i.e., the cost of goods sold to a consumer depends only on the bundle size
she buys. As mentioned before, this cost structure was studied earlier by [1] and [2]. Ob-
serve also that the shortest-path algorithm applies even if the costs are consumer-specific,
i.e., cj are replaced with cij . Nevertheless, cost structures, such as scale economies, cannot
be accommodated even with consumer-specific costs. For example, these models cannot
capture a cost-component that is concave in the sum of the bundle sizes sold to the con-
sumers. This is because the cost of selling an additional unit to a consumer depends on
what other consumers purchase. In this section, we extend our analyses to a more general
cost structure. We remark that although we express these changes in terms of costs, they
can also be used to model additional value generated for the vendor by sale of extra goods
to consumers. For example, these ideas can be used to model a convex value function that
depends on the total sales, which may capture benefits due to externalities or larger market
presence.
3.4.1 Discrete Case
In this section, we consider the discrete case where Bundles 0, . . . , J are offered by
the vendor, and a cost function C ′(j1, . . . , jI) – where, for each i, ji represents the bundle
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size allocated to Consumer i – is submodular in {j1, . . . , jI}. We define zij =
∑J
j′=j xij .
Then, observe that xij = zij − zij+1, where ziJ+1 is understood to be zero. Also, observe


















If we define C(z) = C ′
(∑J










vij(zij − zij+1)− C(z)
s.t. zi0 = 1 ∀i (3.29)
zij ≥ zij+1 ∀i; ∀j ≤ J − 1 (3.30)
zij ≤ zi+1j ∀i ≤ I − 1; ∀j (3.31)
zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i; ∀j. (3.32)
Given the definition of zij , Constraint (3.29), Constraint (3.31), and Constraint (3.30) are
equivalent to Constraint (3.2), Constraint (3.7), and the non-negativity of xij variables re-
spectively. Therefore:
Proposition 3.4.1 The feasible region of CBPg (resp., relaxation of CBPg with no inte-
grality constraints on z) is obtained via a one-to-one linear transformation zij =
∑J
j′=j xij
from the feasible region of CBP2 (resp., relaxation of CBPg with no integrality constraints
on x).
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We next show that the feasible region of CBPg forms a lattice family [10]. A family
C of sets is called a lattice family if for all A, B ∈ C, it holds that A ∪ B, A ∩ B ∈ C. A
set A can be mapped into binary values using its incidence vector, i.e., a vector χA whose
entries are labeled with the elements of the universal set and χAi = 1 ⇔ i ∈ A, otherwise
χAi = 0. We claim that the binary solutions feasible to CBPg are incidence vectors of a
lattice family. In order to show this, consider two feasible solutions z1 and z2 and construct
z′ (resp., z′′) such that z′ij = max{z1ij, z2ij} (resp., z′′ij = min{z1ij, z2ij}). We verify that z′
and z′′ are feasible to CBPg. First consider z′. Constraints (3.29) and (3.32) are obviously
satisfied. The following shows that z′ satisfies Constraint (3.30): z′ij = max{z1ij, z2ij} ≥
max{z1ij+1, z2ij} ≥ max{z1ij+1, z2ij+1} = z′ij+1, where the inequalities follow because z1
and z2 satisfy Constraint (3.30). Similarly, it follows that z′ satisfies Constraint (3.31). The
arguments for showing feasibility of z′′ are similar. We refer to z′ (respectively, z′′) as the
join (respectively, the meet) of z1 and z2 and denote it as z1 ∨ z2 (respectively, z1 ∧ z2).
Proposition 3.4.2 For any z in the feasible region of CBPg and i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, let ji be
as given in (3.28). Then, C(z) is submodular over the feasible region of CBPg.
We remark that Proposition 3.4.2 only shows the submodularity of C(z) for points
feasible to CBPg.2 We now show that CBPg can be solved in strongly polynomial time,
which thereby yields an efficient algorithm for the vendor to price the bundles.
2Consider, for example, allocations x1 and x2 such that, for some i, x1i1 = 0.5, x
1
i3 = 0.5, and x
2
i2 = 1. Let
z1 and z2 be the corresponding solutions in the z-space and define z′ = z1 ∨ z2 and z′′ = z1 ∧ z2. Then, it
follows that z1i = (1, 1, 0.5, 0.5) and z
2
i = (1, 1, 1, 0). Using (3.28), the first solution corresponds to j
1
i = 2,
and the second solution also corresponds to j2i = 2. But, z
′
i = (1, 1, 1, 0.5) and z
′′
i = (1, 1, 0.5, 0) and the
corresponding j′i = 2.5 whereas j
′′
i = 1.5. Therefore, for general z, the submodularity does not follow.
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Theorem 3.4.1 If C(z) is submodular over the feasible region of CBPg, and for a given
z, C(z) can be evaluated in strongly polynomial time, then CBPg can be solved in strongly
polynomial time.
We remark that the algorithm that is used in Theorem 3.4.1 to solve CBPg in poly-
nomial time is based on extending C(z) from the lattice family to a submodular function
over [0, 1]I×(J+1), which still attains the same maximum. Then, the new function can be
maximized in polynomial time using the algorithm of [11] or [12]. Exposing the structure
of this problem brings many tools from supermodular optimization that can be used to bear
on the cardinality bundling problem. For example, one can readily say that the optimal
solutions of CBPg forms a non-empty subcomplete lattice of its feasible set [?, Corollary
2.7.1 in]]t98.
We now consider a more interesting application. Assume that C(z) = C ′′(m, z)
where m are some parameters of the cost function. Assume C ′′(m, z) is submodular in
(−m, z) space. Then, it follows from Theorem 2.7.6 in [13] that the optimal solution is a
supermodular function of m. In the setting of Section 3.2, this can be interpreted by letting
m denote the marginal cost vector, i.e., mj = cj − cj−1. Assume now two settings, with
marginal costs m1 and m2 and assume m1 ≥ m2. Then, the reduction in profit for an
increase in m1 by some ∆ is no more than the reduction in profit for an increase in m2 by
the same ∆.
In this setting, we can also extend the result of Corollary 11 in [9]. According to
this corrollary, if the marginal cost decreases, then every consumer will shift to purchase
weakly larger sized bundles. First, we provide a standard definition of set ordering. Given
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two sets of allocationsX ′ andX ′′ we say that a setX ′ v X ′′, or thatX ′ is smaller thanX ′′,
if for every allocation z′ ∈ X ′ and z′′ ∈ X ′′, it holds that z′ ∧ z′′ ∈ X ′ and z′ ∨ z′′ ∈ X ′′.
Corollary 3.4.2 If C ′′(m, z) is submodular in (m, z) then the set of optimal solutions of
CBPg are increasing in m, i.e., consumers buy non-increasing bundle sizes with increase
in m. Let m1 > m2 and assume that C ′′(m, z) has strictly increasing differences in (m, z).
If z′ (resp. z′′) is an optimal solution to CBPg with m1 (resp. m2) then z′ ≥ z′′.
3.4.2 Continuous Case
In this section, we explore the extension of the continuous case to allow for sub-
modular cost functions. The continuous case with separable costs are discussed in [9].
Here we first briefly review the model. The model is similar to CBP1 except that we use
a continuous variable y ∈ R+ to represent the bundle sizes, instead of using an index j to
denote discrete sizes. Then all the other variables xij and pj , and parameters wij that are
previously indexed with j ,now become a function of y: xi(y), p(y), and wi(y). Thus the






s.t. wi(yi)− p(yi) ≥ wi(y)− p(y) ∀i ∀y. (3.33)
Next, based on CBPc1, we discuss the continuous case with submodular cost func-
tion. As before, we define vi(y) = wi(y)−(I−i)(wi+1(y)−wi(y)) for all i, wherewI+1(y)





vi(yi)− C ′(y1, . . . , yI)
s.t. yi+1 ≥ yi 1 ≤ i ≤ I − 1 (3.34)
0 ≤ yi ≤ Y ∀i, (3.35)
where we assume that C ′(y) is submodular in y. Let k(·) : {0, . . . , J} → [0, Y ] be such
that 0 = k(0) < · · · < k(J) = Y . We assume that for all i, wi(y) are piecewise-linear with
breakpoints that belong to {k(0), . . . , k(J)}. In [9], we also assumed piecewise-linearity
for the cost. We extend this assumption to the current setting. Observe that this requires
some detail since C ′(·) is now a multi-dimensional function.
Consider a y ∈ RI that is feasible to CBPgcy. For each i, let a(yi) = arg minj{yi−
k(j) | k(j) ≤ yi}. If k(a(yi)) = Y define g(yi) = 0, otherwise define g(yi) = yi−k(a(yi))k(a(yi)+1)−k(a(yi)) .
Assume that π = (π(1), . . . , π(I)) is a permutation of {1, . . . , I} that sorts g(yi) such
that g(yπ(1)) ≥ · · · ≥ g(yπ(I)). If g(yi) = g(yi′) for some i < i′, we assume that
π−1(i′) < π−1(i). Let ei be a unit vector such that eii = 1 and e
i
i′ = 0 for i 6= i′. For
r = 0, . . . , I , define ar = (a(y1), . . . , a(yI)) +
∑r
i=1 e
π(i). Let yr be defined so that
yri = k(a
r
i ) if a
r
i ≤ J and yri = Y otherwise. It is clear that, for all i, yri ∈ {k0, . . . , kJ}.
Therefore, yr satisfies Constraint (3.35). We now argue that ari ≤ ari+1 for i ≤ I − 1. Ob-
serve that this implies that yr satisfies Constraint (3.34) and is feasible to CBPgcy because
k(j) ≤ k(j′) for j < j′.
Lemma 3.4.3 ari ≤ ari+1 for i ≤ I − 1. Consequently, yr is feasible to CBPgcy.
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For notational convenience, define π(0) = 0, π(I + 1) = I + 1, g(y0) = 1, and






C ′(yr). For ex-
ample, we discuss later that this property is satisfied by piecewise linear or concave cost


























= k(a(yi))(1− g(yi)) + k(a(yi) + 1)g(yi)
= yi.
(3.36)
Therefore, y can be expressed as a convex combination of feasible points yr, r = 0, . . . , I
and we have assumed that the convex combination underestimates the cost. This hypothesis
is sufficient to show that the solution of the continuous cardinality bundling problem can
be restricted to lie on the breakpoints.
Theorem 3.4.4 Assume wi(·) are piecewise linear with breakpoints in {k(0), . . . , k(J)}.








Then, there exists an optimal solution y∗ to CBPgcy that is such that, for all i, y∗i ∈







vij(zij − zij+1)− C(z) | (3.29), (3.30), (3.31), (3.32)
}
,




k(j)− k(j − 1)
)













k(j)− k(j − 1)
)
z∗ij .
Since, by Theorem 3.4.1, CBPgcz can be solved in strongly polynomial time, we
have the following:
Corollary 3.4.5 Assume wi(·) are piecewise linear with breakpoints in {k(0), . . . , k(J)}.







Then, CBPgcy can be solved in strongly polynomial time (assuming k(0), . . . , k(J) are
part of the input).
We remark that Theorem 3.4.4 generalizes Theorem 16 and Corollary 17 in [9]. This is be-
cause the cost functions treated in [9] are additively separable, i.e., sum of one-dimensional
functions, which are always submodular. Further, piecewise-linearity assumed in [9] is






C ′(yr) in Theo-
rem 3.4.4. In fact, in the case of one-dimensional functions, the right-hand side is precisely
the piecewise linear function with breakpoints at (k(0), . . . , k(J)). Since the inequality
holds trivially, the generalization follows. Similarly, the following result can be easily
obtained.
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Corollary 3.4.6 Assume wi(·) are piecewise linear with breakpoints in {k(0), . . . , k(J)}.
Further, assume that C ′(y) is concave and submodular. Then, CBPgcy can be solved using
CBPgcz in strongly polynomial time (assuming k(0), . . . , k(J) are part of the input).
Now, we consider the general case, where the WTP and cost functions are not
necessarily piecewise-linear. We assume thatwi(·) andC ′(·) are Liptschitz continuous with
Lipschitz constant β, i.e., for all i, |wi(yi) − wi(y′i)| ≤ β|yi − y′i| and |C ′(y) − C ′(y′)| ≤
β‖y − y′‖. We show that Theorem 3.4.4 gives an approach to approximate the solution
of this more general problem. We construct piecewise-linear approximations of wi(y) and




and J = dY
k
e. We let k(j) = jk for j =











C ′(yr). Observe that wki (·) and C ′
k(·)
satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3.4.4. Let Πc be the optimal value of CBPgcy and Πk
denote the optimal profit when wki (·) and C ′
k(·) are the WTP for Consumer i and the cost
function respectively.




. Then, Πk ≤ Πc ≤ Πk + ε. Further,
Πk can be computed in time that is polynomial in I , Y , β, 1
ε
, and the time taken by the
oracle call to compute C ′(y).
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we first extend the existing CB model to allow fixed costs in adding
additional bundles. We show that CB problem with fixed costs can be solved as a shortest-
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path problem. We then extend the CB model in another way to solve CB problem with sub-
modular cost structure. Such an analysis is especially useful when there exists economies
of scale in production.
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4. CARDINALITY BUNDLES WITH CONSTRAINED PRICES
4.1 Introduction
This paper studies a bundling schemed called cardinality bundling (CB). in CB,
vendors price for the number of goods and let consumers choose with specific products
they what. Pricing for toppings of pizza is a simple example of CB. In many pizza stores,
consumers are priced for the number of toppings regardless of the specific topping types.
Similarly, Disney World uses CB to sell theme park tickets. Instead of selling tickets for
each park separately, Disney World prices consumers for the number of visits to all its
theme parks. More generally, information goods providers such as Netflix and Block-
buster, telecommunication service providers such as AT&T, and cable TV providers such
as Eastlink, are also implementing CB in selling their products or services.
We next briefly review the literature on CB. [1] develop the first cardinality bundling
model. They discover some properties for the optimal solution of cardinality bundling
problem with assuming that consumers’ willingness-to-pays follow Spence-Mirrlees Sin-
gle Crossing Property (SCP). [6] show that the profitability of CB is more than component
pricing and pure bundling, and is close to that of mixed bundling by using computational
and empirical approaches. [9] analytically studies the optimal pricing strategies for CB
problems with SCP consumer valuations. They show that the optimal prices to the prob-
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lem can be obtained, in strongly polynomial time, by solving a linear programming (LP)
problem. Based on the network structure underlying the dual of the LP formulation, they
develop an algorithm to solve the quantity-discount problem proposed by [2].
The models in [1] and [9] assume that each consumer can only purchase no more
than one bundle. This assumption is valid in some industries. For example, each home
usually has no more than one cable TV connection and therefore is only able to purchase
at most one cable TV bundle. Other examples include toppings of pizza and cellular data
pricing plans. However, in some other industries, consumers are not restricted to only pur-
chase one bundle. For example, consumers can easily purchase multiple bundles of songs
at on-line music stores. As a result, the insights obtained by these works do not necessarily
extend to situations when the consumers may purchase more than one bundle. In this paper,
we relax the one bundle per consumer assumption. We introduce sub-additive constraints
on bundle prices to ensure that the consumer incentive compatibility is not violated even if
consumers are allowed to purchase more than one bundle of goods.
In reality, three main types of sub-additive price schemes are used in different in-
dustries. (1) Marginal decreasing prices (MDP) where the marginal price of each additional
unit is weakly decreasing, which is also known as multiple-part tariff pricing [14]. (2) Unit
decreasing prices where the unit price of each bundle is weakly decreasing. Since this type
of price scheme is first introduced by [6] as bundle-size pricing (BSP), we also call it BSP
in this paper. (3) General form of sub-additive prices (CBSP) where the price of any bundle
is no less than the total price of any two other bundles which can together form the previous
one. In this paper, we study these various kinds of CB problems with different constraints
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on bundle prices. In order to get tractable and meaningful results, we additionally assume
Spence-Mirrlees Single Crossing Property (SCP) on consumers’ reservation price. We first
develop a shortest-path solution approach for MDP. Second, we propose a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm to solve BSP. Third, we analyze the CB problem with sub-additive
prices and convert its MINLP formulation to a mixed-integer programming (MIP) one.
Finally, we provide analytical and numerical analysis on the gaps between different CB
models.
4.2 Marginal Decreasing Prices (MDP)
4.2.1 Model
In this section, we consider the cardinality bundling problem with marginal de-
creasing prices. The model is built upon that in [9] and we review it here for the sake of
completeness. In this model, a vendor implements cardinality bundling to sell his goods
and seeks a optimal price scheme for each bundle size to maximize his profit. Each con-
sumer makes her purchase decision to maximize her consumer surplus. If a consumer gets
negative surplus from all the bundle sizes, she will purchase nothing.
In this section, the vendor imposes marginal decreasing prices, or MDP, to insure
that for each additional unit, the marginal price is no more than that of the previous unit. It
is straightforward that if the marginal price for each additional unit is weakly decreasing,
than the price of any bundle will always be weakly less than the total price of any other two
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smaller-sized bundles which can form the previous one. As a result, any rational consumer
will never purchase more than one bundle.
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , I} denote consumer indexes and j ∈ {0, . . . , J} denote bundle
size indexes. Notice, Bundle 0 is included in the model to represent consumer’s choice of
purchasing nothing. Let pj and cj denote the price and cost of Bundle j. Let wij ≥ 0 be
the willingness-to-pay of Consumer i for Bundle j. Let xij be a binary variable indicating











(wij′ − pj′)xij′ ≥ wij − pj ∀i, ∀j (4.1)
p0 = 0 (4.2)
pj − pj−1 ≤ pj−1 − pj−2 ∀j ≥ 2 (4.3)
J∑
j=0
xij = 1 ∀i (4.4)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, ∀j. (4.5)
Following [1] and [9], we also assume that consumers’ WTP follows the Spence-
Mirrlees Single Crossing Property (SCP):
wij ≥ wi′j ∀i > i′, (4.6)
wij − wij′ ≥ wi′j − wi′j′ ∀i > i′, ∀j > j′. (4.7)
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4.2.2 Properties of the Optimal Solution
First, we identify some properties of the optimal solution.1 Let wmij = wij −
wi,j−1 ∀i ∀j ≥ 1 and wmi0 = 0 be the marginal WTP of each consumer i for each ad-
ditional unit of goods j. Let pmj be the marginal price for each unit of goods j. Similarly,
let cmj be the marginal cost for each unit of goods j.






xi,j′ i = 1, . . . , I − 1, ∀j. (4.8)
Proposition 4.2.2 There exists an optimal pricing scheme such that if two bundle sizes j
and j′ are bought by some consumers and j′ > j then pj′ − cj′ > pj − cj .
Lemma 4.2.1 Among the consumers purchasing a non-zero bundle size, the lowest indexed
one is charged at her WTP in every optimal solution.
Proposition 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and Lemma 4.2.1 are proved in [9] when there is no con-
straints on bundle prices. In this paper, we show that in CB models such as MDP, BSP,
or CBSP, where the bundle prices are constrained with various kinds of conditions, Propo-
sition 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and Lemma 4.2.1 are still valid and therefore can be useful to derive
solution approaches for these problems.
In MDP1, we have an additional property that plays a critical roll to solve the
problem.
1All the proofs are omitted.
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Proposition 4.2.3 In the optimal solution, pm∗j , the optimal marginal price for any unit j,
satisfies the following condition:
pm∗1 ∈ {wm11, · · · , wmI1}, pm∗j ∈ {wm1j, · · · , wmi′j, pm∗j−1}∀j ≥ 2,
where i′ = arg Maxi{wmij ≤ pm∗j−1}. That is, the optimal marginal price for any unit j is
priced at the same marginal price as Bundle j − 1, or at some consumer’s marginal WTP
on Bundle j that is no more than pm∗j−1.
By Proposition 4.2.3, we know that pm∗1 ∈ {wm11, · · · , wmi′1}, or, the marginal price
of the first unit is priced at one consumer’s marginal WTP for the first unit. Next, we
can easily get pm∗2 ∈ {wm11, · · · , wmI1, wm12, · · · , wmI2}, or, the marginal price of the first unit
is priced at one consumer’s marginal WTP for the first two units. Recursively, we have
pm∗j ∈ {wm11, · · · , wmI1, wm12, · · · , wmI2,
· · · , wm1j, · · · , wmIj}.
Proposition 4.2.4 Let vjij′ = (I − i′ + 1)(wmij′ − cmj ) where i′ = arg Mini′′{wmi′′j ≥ wmij }.
vjij′ capture how the total profit will change if the marginal price of Bundle j is priced at
the marginal WTP of Consumer i for Bundle j′.
Next, we convert MDP1 to a shortest path problem. Let xjij′ , j′ ≤ j be a binary
variable to indicate whether the marginal price of Bundle j is priced at the marginal WTP
of Consumer i for Bundle j′. Let chiĩj̃
′
jij′ , j
′ ≤ j, j̃′ ≤ j − 1 be a binary variable to indicate












0 if wmij′ = w
m
ĩj̃′






Then we can reformulate MDP1 to the following shortest-path problem:
Theorem 4.2.2 MDP1 is equivalent to the following shortest path problem on a graph











































jij′ = xjij′ , ∀i ∀j ∀j








jij′ , ∀ĩ ∀j ∀j̃′ ≤ j − 1 (4.13)
χĩj̃
′
jij′ ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∀j ∀j
′ ≤ j ∀ĩ ∀j̃′ ≤ j − 1. (4.14)
4.3 Unit Decreasing Prices (BSP)
Instead of imposing the marginal decreasing prices, another way to solving the
problem without the single bundle restriction on the consumer is to impose a non-increasing
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unit price constraint on the prices set by the vendor. In such a case, naturally, no consumer
will have an incentive to buy more than one bundle to form the bundle of her desired




∀j ≤ J − 1, in their cardinality bundling









s.t. (4.1), (4.2), (4.4), (4.5),
pj/j ≥ pj+1/(j + 1) ∀j ≤ J − 1 (4.15)
The non-increasing unit price constraint is specified in Equation (4.15). Because of this
constraint, the problem does not retain the structure of the shortest-path problem for MDP1.
Notice, Proposition 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and Lemma 4.2.1 are still valid under BSP1 but Propo-
sition 4.2.3 is not valid anymore. We next develop some new properties for BSP1. From
now on, we relax the concavity assumption on consumers’ WTP.
Proposition 4.3.1 For a given price scheme, assume that Bundle j is purchased by some
consumer(s). Also assume that pj+1, pj+2, · · · , pJ are all high enough so that no consumer
purchase any bundle size greater than j. If we reduce pj+1 to a certain level such that some
consumer change to purchase pj+1, then this consumer purchases Bundle j before pj+1 is
changed.
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Next, we develop a unit-price based dynamic programming algorithm for solving
BSP1 when the costs are separable in bundle sizes. In this algorithm, the unit prices can
only take discrete values. The feasible set of unit prices correspond to a grid of length ε.
There are total K points on the grid. K is determined by K = WIJ/ε, where WIJ is last
consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the largest bundle size. We use the variable k = 1 to
denote the individual grid points and uk as the corresponding unit price. largest bundle
size. We use k = 0, 1, . . . , K for grid step index and uk for unit price on grid step k.
According to the definition of BSP, all bundle sizes are available in the market and
the unit price of each bundle is no more than a smaller-sized bundle. Our algorithm start
with finding out the maximum total profit when the unit price of Bundle 1 is priced at uk
and the unit price of any other larger-sized bundle is also priced at uk. This situation is
same as providing all bundles with the same unit price uk. For each grid index k, we can
easily find out which consumer i is the lowest type consumer starting to purchase and how
many units she want to purchase according to her WTP. Similarly, we can also find out how
many units each other higher type consumer purchases and then get the total profit by the
vendor. We denote this profit value as Πi1k. More generally, let Πijk be the maximum total
profit if bundle size j is the first one to be provided at unit price uk (i.e., the unit price of any
smaller-sized bundle is greater than uk) and consumer i is the first one to start purchasing
this bundle.
We have already show how to calculate Πi1k ∀i, ∀k. We can then calculate
Πi2k ∀i, ∀k, based on Πi1k results. We use a function ∆(i, 2, k, i′, 1, k′) to calculate the
change in total profit for a reducing in unit price. It basically calculates which consumers
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will switch from purchasing Bundle 1 to Bundle 2 because of the availability of Bundle 2
and how many units each of these consumers purchase with the new unit price. Therefore,
we have Πi2k = max Πi′1k′ + ∆(i, 2, k, i′, 1, k′). By using the same recursive logic, we
can continue to calculate Πijk for any larger bundle size j as well and can finally find the
optimal solution for the BSP problem.
The pseudo-code for the algorithm is shown as follows:
for i, j; i <= I, j <= J do
u0 = wij/j;
πijK = Π(i, j);
for i1, j1, k1; i ≤ i1 ≤ I, j ≤ j1 ≤ J, k1 ≤ K do
for i2, j2, k2; i2 ≤ i1, j2 ≤ j1, k2 ≤ k1 do
Πtemp = Πi2j2k2 + ∆(i2, j2, k2, i1, j1, k1)









Algorithm 1: A Dynamic Programming Algorithm for BSP
Theorem 4.3.1 When the costs are separable in bundle sizes, for any given total error εt,
let the grid step length parameter be ε = 2εt/(J + 1)JI . Then the proposed algorithm
guarantees that the gap between the optimal profit and the solution generated by the al-
gorithm is no more than εt. Moreover, the computation complexity is O(I3J4K2), where
K = WIJ/ε.
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4.4 Sub-Additive Price (CBSP)
In the previous section, we remove consumers’ incentives to purchase more than
one bundle by imposing the non-decreasing unit price constraint. However, in some cases
it may be a more strict constraint than necessary. The following example illustrates that the
non-decreasing unit price constraint may reduce vendor’s profits.
Example 4.4.1 A music store can offer a single song for $4 each, and a bundle size 10 for
$10. If someone wants 11 songs, she needs to pay $14 to get a bundle and a single song,
which has a higher unit price than that of bundle size 10. Imposing the non-decreasing unit
price constraint in this scenario will reduce vendor’s profits.
To overcome this issue, we propose a CBSP model, cardinality bundling problems
with sub-additive prices, in this section. Formulating the CBSP problem is similar to BSP1,
except replacing the non-increasing unit price Constraints (4.15) with the following price
sub-additivity constraints:




Proposition 4.4.1 Solutions to CBP and BSP are respectively the lower and upper bounds
for CBSP.
CBP is the CB problem without any constraints on bundle prices. It is easy to understand
the rationale behind this result. On one hand, CBP is the same problem as CBSP except
that the price sub-additivity constraints are relaxed. One the other hand, price constraints
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in BSP are stricter constraints than sub-additivity constraints in CBSP, leading to an under-
estimation of CBSP.
When the costs are separable, it is possible to create an MIP formulation. Notice
that the nonlinearity of the objective function in CBSP comes from xijpj . Therefore, we
introduce qij = xijpj to replace all the nonlinear items. By adding Constraints (4.20) -











xij = 1 ∀i (4.16)
J∑
j′=0
(wij′xij′ − qij′) ≥ wij − pj ∀i, ∀j (4.17)
pj ≤ pj′ + pj−j′ ∀j ∀j′ <
1
2
(j + 1) (4.18)
pj ≤ pj+1 ∀j ≤ J − 1 (4.19)
qij ≥ xijpLj ∀j (4.20)
qij ≤ xijpUj ∀j (4.21)
qij ≥ xijpUj + pj − pUj ∀j (4.22)
qij ≤ xijpLj + pj − pLj ∀j. (4.23)
Here, pLj and p
U
j are upper and lower bound for each pj . Constraints (4.20) - (4.23) ensure
that if xij = 0, then qij = 0, and if xij = 1, then qij = pj . Therefore, MIP formulation
CBSP1 always has the same solution as the MINLP CBSP problem.
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4.5 Gap Analyses
Table 4.1.: Comparison of CBP, CBSP, and BSP
Optimal profit Gap
Problem No. Problem size(I,J) CBP CBSP BSP CBP BSP
1 20,20 152.384 149.884 148.679 1.67% -0.80%
2 20,20 0.8 0.78 0.775 2.56% -0.64%
3 20,20 16.199 16.123 16.119 0.47% -0.02%
4 20,20 22.536 22.536 22.504 0.00% -0.14%
5 20,20 39.435 39.014 38.902 1.08% -0.29%
Average 46.271 45.667 45.396 1.16% -0.38%
We also numerically evaluated how well the three mechanisms compare when the
costs are zero. Table 4.1 shows five numerical examples with 20 consumers and 20 bundles
sizes. All consumers’ WTP is randomly generated according to SCP. In Column three to
five, optimal profits for CBP, CBSP, and BSP are shown. We can see that for all the prob-
lems, CBP optimal value is (weakly) greater than that of CBSP which is (weakly) greater
than that of BSP. We observe that the gaps can be large when using CBP compared to BSP.
To investigate this issue further, we have also theoretically analyzed the gap between CBP
and CBSP, and that between BSP and CBSP when the costs are separable in bundle sizes.
Let Π∗CBP , Π
∗
BSP , and Π
∗
CBSP be the optimal profits if the vendor implements CBP, BSP,
or CBSP respectively.
Proposition 4.5.1 When the costs are separable in bundle sizes:
















In this study, we first study the CB problem with marginal decreasing prices and
prove that it is a shortest-path problem. Second, we propose a dynamic programming
algorithm to solve the CB problem with unit decreasing prices. Third, we analyze the CB
problem with sub-additive prices and convert its MINLP formulation to a mixed-integer
programming (MIP) one. Finally, we provide analytical and numerical analysis on the
gaps between different CB models. We reconcile the differences in the optimal solutions
obtained via different formulations of cardinality bundling in the literature.
There are several ways to extend the current study. First, there is still room to im-
prove the performance of proposed dynamic programming algorithm for the BSP problem
by combining it with LP cuttings. Second, CBSP problem has only been converted to an
MIP, which is still N-P hard. Third, the gap analysis between MDP to BSP is still miss-
ing. Last but not least, analyzing cardinality bundling problems without Spence-Mirrlees
condition can provide a wider application of these pricing schemes in reality.
APPENDICES
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A. Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
Proof Assume p′ is an optimal price vector that is not non-decreasing and k, the smallest
index for which p′k > p
′
k+1, is the largest among all optimal price vectors. We claim that
for every feasible solution to CBP1 and for all i, xik = 0. Otherwise, Constraint (3.2)
implies that xik′ = 0 for all k′ 6= k. Since wik ≤ wik+1, wik − p′k < wik+1 − p′k+1 which
violates Constraint (3.1). Therefore, xik = 0. Consider now a price vector p such that
pj = p
′
j for all j 6= k and pk = pk+1. Let (x, p′) be feasible to CBP1. Since xik = 0,
the objective value for x is the same for both p′ and p. We claim that (x, p) is also feasible
to CBP1 and therefore the optimal value with price p does not decrease. This is because∑J
j′=0(wij′ − pj′)xij′ ≥
∑J
j′=0(wij′ − p′j′)xij′ ≥ wik+1 − p′k+1 ≥ wik − pk, where the first
inequality follows since p′ ≥ p, the second because (x, p′) is feasible, and the last because
wik+1 ≥ wik and pk = p′k+1. Further, existence of k′ > k such that pk′ > pk′+1 contradicts
the choice of p′. Therefore, p must be non-decreasing.
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B. Proof of Proposition 2.2.2
Proof We show the result for a fixed price vector. Then, the first part follows by applying
the argument to an optimal price vector. Observe that there are finitely many solutions to
CBP1 in the x-space for a given p. We consider the allocations that yield the most profit
and order them arbitrarily. Let jk(i′) denote the bundle Consumer i′ buys in the kth such
solution to CBP1. Then, let k′ = arg maxk mini′′
{
i′′ | jk(i′′) > jk(i′′ + 1)
}
. This means
that k′ is the optimal solution where the first consumer that buys a larger sized bundle than
her immediate successor is of the highest type. Let i ∈ arg mini′′{i′′ | jk′(i′′) > jk′(i′′+1)}.
Now, construct the solution j(·) where j(i′) = jk′(i′) when i′ 6= i+ 1 and j(i+ 1) = jk′(i).
We show that j(·) is a feasible assignment of bundles to consumers which achieves at least
the same objective function value, thus deriving a contradiction to the choice of k′. Since
we do not change the assignment for any i′ 6= i+1, we only need to verify that j(·) satisfies
wi+1j(i+1)−pj(i+1) ≥ wi+1j−pj for all j. Now, consider the following chain of inequalities:
0 ≥ wi+1jk′ (i) − pjk′ (i) − wi+1jk′ (i+1) + pjk′ (i+1)
≥ wijk′ (i) − pjk′ (i) − wijk′ (i+1) + pjk′ (i+1)
≥ 0,
69
where the first inequality follows because i + 1 chooses jk′(i + 1), the second inequality
because jk′(i) > jk′(i+1) implies by SCP thatwi+1jk′ (i)−wi+1jk′ (i+1) ≥ wijk′ (i)−wijk′ (i+1)
and the last inequality because i chooses jk′(i). Therefore, equality holds throughout.
Then, for any j, it follows that
wi+1j(i+1) − pj(i+1) = wi+1jk′ (i) − pjk′ (i) = wi+1jk′ (i+1) − pjk′ (i+1) ≥ wi+1j − pj,
where the first equality follows because j(i + 1) = jk′(i), the second equality follows
from the argument above, and the first inequality because i + 1 chooses jk′(i + 1) under
the feasible solution jk′(·). Therefore, we have shown that j(·) is a feasible assignment
of bundles to consumers. Now, we show that the corresponding objective value does not










pjk′ (i′) − cjk′ (i′)
)




pjk′ (i′) − cjk′ (i′)
)
,
where the first equality follows by the definition of j(·). The first inequality follows because
pjk′ (i)− cjk′ (i) ≥ pjk′ (i+1)− cjk′ (i+1) is implied by wijk′ (i)−pjk′ (i)−wijk′ (i+1) +pjk′ (i+1) = 0
and optimality of jk′(·) for p. Otherwise, jk′(i + 1) yields the same surplus to i′ as jk′(i),
which means j′(i′) = jk′(i′) for i′ 6= i and j′(i) = jk′(i + 1) is feasible, yielding a strictly
higher objective value than jk′(·).
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C. Proof of Proposition 2.2.3
Proof Consider an optimal solution such that no other optimal solution allocates a subset
of the bundle sizes to the consumers. Assume that the bundle sizes sold are {jk, . . . , j1}
where jk < · · · < j1 and the corresponding price vector is p′. If J 6∈ {jk, . . . , j1}, we
assume without loss of generality that p′J = wIJ + ε for some ε > 0. Similarly, we assume
that for j 6∈ {jk, . . . , j1} ∪ {J}, the price is min{pj′ | ∃j′ ≥ j, j′ ∈ {jk, . . . , j1} ∪ {J}}.
So, by optimality of j′, no consumer purchases any bundles not in {jk, . . . , j1}.
We assume that k ≥ 2 since there is nothing to show otherwise. We show by
induction on r that p′jr+1 − cjr+1 < p
′
jr − cjr for all r < k. Consider r = 1. By Proposi-
tion 2.2.2, Consumers i, . . . , I purchase Bundle j1 for some i ≤ I . Construct a price vector
p′′ where p′′j = p
′
j for j < j1 and p
′′
j1
= wIj1 + ε. Any consumer that does not purchase j1
does not alter her decision since the surplus of non-preferred bundles only decreased with
p′′. Since Consumer i − 1 continues to buy Bundle j2, by Proposition 2.2.2, Consumers
i, . . . , I only consider bundles j2 or higher. Since j1 does not offer any surplus, all these
consumers will purchase Bundle j2. Observe that p′j2 − cj2 ≤ p
′
j1
− cj1 . Otherwise, the
optimal solution with p′′ attains a strictly higher profit. If p′j2 − cj2 = p
′
j1
− cj1 , the optimal
profit attained with p′′ is the same as that with p′. However, this contradicts the selection of
the optimal solution with minimal number of bundles allocated to consumers. Therefore,
p′j2 − cj2 < p
′
j1




and show that p′jr+1 − cjr+1 < p
′
jr − cjr . Let {i1, . . . , it} be the consumers that purchase
Bundle jr. Then, consider the price vector p′′ such that p′′j = p
′
j for j 6= jr and p′′jr = p
′
jr−1 .
Observe that any consumer who does not purchase jr does not change their decision since,
by Proposition 2.2.1, the surplus of non-preferred items only reduced with the price change.
It follows from Proposition 2.2.2 that any consumer in {i1, . . . , it} now purchases one of
the bundles {jr+1, jr, jr−1}. We first show that with p′′, no consumer strictly prefers jr. Let
i ∈ {i1, . . . , it}. Then, wijr − p′′jr = wijr − p
′
jr−1 ≤ wijr−1 − p
′
jr−1 = wijr−1 − p
′′
jr−1 . There-
fore, Consumer i weakly prefers Bundle jr−1 over jr under price p′′. Since we assumed
that consumers purchase bundle sizes that offer most profit to the vendor (among the sizes
that offer maximum surplus), it follows from the induction hypothesis that each consumer
prefers Bundle jr−1 over jr. Now, assume that p′jr+1 − cjr+1 ≥ p
′
jr − cjr , i.e., Bundle jr+1
offers more profit to the vendor as compared to jr. Since all the consumers in {i1, . . . , it}
now purchase either Bundle jr−1 or jr+1, both of which offer either same or more profit to
the vendor compared to p′jr − cjr , the profit under p
′′ must be optimal, and thus contradicts
the minimality of the bundles allocated to consumers. Therefore, p′jr+1 − cjr+1 < p
′
jr − cjr .
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D. Proof of Proposition 2.2.4
Proof Let i1 be the lowest indexed consumer who purchases a bundle of non-zero size,
say j1 > 0. Let p∗ be the optimal price vector. Clearly, p∗j1 ≤ wi1j1 . Now, assume that
p∗j1 < wi1j1 . Consider p
′ = p∗ + ∆, where ∆ = wi1j1 − p∗j1 > 0 and a consumer i
′ that
purchased a bundle, j′ > 0. Then, wi′j′ − p∗j′ ≥ wi′j1 − p∗j1 ≥ wij1 − p
∗
j1
= ∆, where the
first inequality is because i′ prefers j′ over j1 and the second inequality follows from SCP
and i′ > i1. Therefore, wi′j′ − p′j′ = wi′j′ − p∗j′ − ∆ ≥ 0. This shows that any consumer
that purchases j′ with p∗ still prefers j′ to not purchasing anything. For any consumer,
the relative preference between bundles of non-zero size does not change. Therefore, all
consumers that purchased any product still purchase the same product. The consumers that
did not purchase a product with p∗ do not have incentive to purchase a product with p′
because the surpluses have reduced. Therefore, the consumer purchasing decisions do not
change. If I ′ is the set of consumers that purchase a bundle of non-zero size, the vendor
makes an additional |I ′|∆ profit due to the increase in price. Since i1 ∈ I ′, it follows that
|I ′| ≥ 1. However, this yields a contradiction to the optimality of p∗ since p′ yields a strictly
higher profit.
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E. Proof of Proposition 2.2.5
Proof For a given x that satisfies (3.2), (3.4), and (3.7), we obtain the optimal prices. Let
J ′ be the set of bundles of non-zero size that some consumers buy. We will derive the prices
for the bundles in J ′ by solving an optimization model. Given the prices of the bundles in
J ′, we show how to price the remaining bundles. If J 6∈ J ′, the price for Bundle J is
assigned to be wIJ + ε. The price of Bundle 0 is fixed at 0. Now consider a remaining
bundle, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}\(J ′ ∪ {J}). The vendor does not want any consumer to purchase
this bundle. Therefore, he may price j at the price of Bundle j′ = min{j′′ | j′′ ≥ j, j′′ ∈
J ′ ∪ {J}}. Since j ≤ J , it follows that the minimum in the definition of j′ is attained.
Now, we compute prices for the bundles in J ′ by solving CBP1 with x variables
fixed to the values given. To emphasize that optimization is in the space of the p variables,
we refer to this formulation as CBPp. We will show that CBPp can be reformulated into
a model that is much simpler. We replace the consumers that do not purchase any bundle
with the highest type consumer that does not purchase any bundle. (Clearly, if this con-
sumer does not have an incentive to purchase a bundle, the lower-type consumers will not
either.) If every consumer purchases some bundle, we create a consumer whose WTP for
all bundles is 0 and therefore does not buy any bundle. Then, we reindex the consumers to
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1, . . . , I ′. We denote the reindexed WTP as w′ and w′I′+1j = w
′
I′j . We denote by j(i) the





(pj(i) − cj(i)) (E.1)
s.t. w′ij(i) − pj(i) ≥ w′ij(i′) − pj(i′) 1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ I ′ (E.2)
p0 = 0 (E.3)
It can be verified easily that CBP1a and CBPp are equivalent. We assume without loss of
generality, by re-indexing the bundles, that the bundles sizes are {0, 1, . . . , |J ′|}.
Let {i0, i1, . . . , iJ ′} be the lowest-type consumers who buy Bundle j, where by
definition, i0 = 1. Now, we rewrite Constraint (E.2) as w′ij(i) − pj(i) ≥ w′ij − pj for all i
and j ∈ {0, . . . , |J ′|}. Since the constraint for j = j(i) holds trivially, we decompose this
constraint for a Consumer i as follows:
w′ij(i) − pj(i) ≥ w′ij − pj ∀j < j(i) (E.4)
w′ij(i) − pj(i) ≥ w′ij − pj ∀j > j(i). (E.5)
We show that all constraints in (E.4) are redundant except those corresponding to some
i ∈ {i1, . . . , i|J ′|} and j = j(i) − 1. Note that there is no constraint of the type (E.4) for















where the first inequality is because of SCP and ij′ ≤ i for all j′ ≤ j(i), and the second
inequality uses (E.4) for some i ∈ {i1, . . . , i|J ′|} and where j = j(i) − 1. Therefore, we
replace (E.4) by the following:
w′ijj − pj ≥ w
′
ijj−1 − pj−1 1 ≤ j ≤ |J
′|. (E.6)
We will now show that in every optimal solution the inequalities in (E.6) are binding. We
consider a feasible p to CBP1a where at least one of the (E.6) is not binding. Then, we
show that p is not optimal by constructing p′ which is feasible, has at least one more (E.6)
binding, and has a higher objective function value than p. Let j′ = arg min{j | w′ijj−pj >
w′ijj−1 − pj−1}, the index of the first inequality that is not binding, and ∆ = w
′
ij′j
′ − pj′ >
w′ij′j′−1−pj′−1. Then, consider the price vector p
′, where p′j = pj for j < j
′ and p′j = pj+∆
otherwise. Then, it is easy to see that for j 6= j′, the left hand side of (E.6) changes by the
same amount as the right hand side. Therefore, if the inequality was binding for p then it
remains binding for p′. Further, the adjustment of p′j′ guarantees that (E.6) is binding for
j = j′. Now, we show that p′ is also feasible to (E.5). If j(i) < j′ the inequality follows
since the surplus of bundles that the consumer does not buy only increases. If j(i) ≥ j′,




pj(i) − cj(i) <
ij′−1∑
i=1




where the inequality follows because ij′ ≤ I ′ and p′i > pi for i ≥ ij′ .
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Constraint (E.5) is redundant since:















= pj − pj(i).
Here, the first inequality follows from SCP and that ij′ ≥ i whenever j′ ≥ j(i) + 1, the
second equality because (E.6) is tight at an optimal solution.
For any j ∈ J ′, we give a closed-form formula for pj . Since pj(1) = 0 and Con-











It is easy to verify that the above formula is equivalent to (2.10). We define i|J ′|+1 = I ′+ 1
and let w′I′+1j = w
′

























































(I ′ − ir + 1)w′irj(ir) − (I

































I′j . By Proposition 2.2.2, every
consumer i′, who purchases a bundle of non-zero size, is reindexed to some consumer in
{1, . . . , I ′}. Let this index be i and observe that I − i′ = I ′− i. Therefore, the last equality
follows.
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F. Proof of Proposition 2.2.6
Proof Consider any subset, T of the allocation variables, xij . By Theorem III.1.2.7 in
[15], the constraint matrix of CBP2 is totally unimodular if and only if T can be partitioned












∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (F.1)
We construct such a partition. For Consumer i, let T contain {xij1 . . . , xijki}. If ki is odd,
we include {xij1 , xij3 , . . . , xijki} in T1. Otherwise, we include {xij2 , xij4 , . . . , xijki}. The
remaining variables are in T2. We do the same for every consumer. Now, consider the
variables in T that have a non-zero coefficient in Constraint (3.7). Among these, let the
number of variables for Consumer i that belong to T1 (resp. T2) be ai (resp. bi). Clearly,
bi ∈ {ai − 1, ai} and the same conclusion holds for Consumer i+ 1’s allocation. Then, for
Constraint (3.7), the sum of the coefficients for variables in T1 minus the sum of coefficients
for variables in T2 equals ai − bi − ai+1 + bi+1. Then,
−1 ≤ −ai+1 + bi+1 ≤ ai − bi − ai+1 + bi+1 ≤ ai − bi ≤ 1.
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c ≤ 1. Further, (F.1) holds trivially for bound constraints since they have
only one variable with non-zero coefficient.
80
G. Proof of Proposition 2.2.7











xIj ≤ 1 (G.1)
xij ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀j. (G.2)
First, observe that xij ≤
∑J
j′=0 xij = 1. Therefore, xij ≤ 1 can be dropped from CBP2.
Obviously, (G.1) is implied by (3.2). Therefore, CBP2b is a relaxation of CBP2. We now
show the reverse inclusion. We next prove that (3.2) is also implied by (G.1) and (3.7).







The first inequality follows from (3.7) and the second from (G.1). Since xi0 does not
appears in the objective function of CBP2, if
∑J
j=0 xij < 1 for some i, we can set xi0 =
1 −
∑J
j=0 xij and make
∑J
j=0 xij = 1 without affecting the objective value or any other
constraints. Therefore, CBP2b is equivalent to CBP2.
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Next, we prove that CBP2a is equivalent to CBP2b. Given a solution x feasible
to CBP2b. We show that we can construct (a, x) that is feasible to CBP2a that has the




j′=j xij′ . Here, xI+1,J is assumed to be 1 and
xI+1,j,∀j 6= J is 0. Observe that (2.11) is satisfied by definition:













xij′) + xij − xi+1,j
= xi+1,j − xij + xij − xi+1,j
= 0.
Further, (2.12) is satisfied because of aIJ + xIJ = 1− xIJ + xIJ = 1. (2.14) follows from
(3.7) and (G.2).
Let (a, x) be a feasible solution to CBP2a. Observe that 0 ≤ aij = aij − aiJ =∑J
j′=j xi+1,j′−
∑J
j′=j xij′ . The first inequality is by (2.14), first equality is by (2.13), second
equality is by summing (2.11) for j′ from j to J . Therefore, x satisfies (3.7). Now, consider
0 ≤ aI0 = aI0 − aIJ + aIJ = 0−
J−1∑
j′=0
xIj′ + 1− xIJ ,
where the first inequality is by (2.14), second equality is by summing (2.11) for j′ from j
to J − 1 with (2.12). Therefore, x satisfies (G.1). Clearly, xij ≥ 0 by (2.14). Since the
objective depends only on x, we have shown that x is feasible to CBP2b with the same
objective value as (a, x) in CBP2a. Therefore, we have shown the converse.
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H. Proof of Theorem 2.2.3
Proof Let lij, (i, j) 6= (IJ) be the multiplier for each constraint in (2.11) with correspond-
ing (i, j) and lIJ for (2.12). Then we can easily get that CBP2d is the dual of CBP2a.
We next show that there exists an optimal solution to CBP2d such that for each
(i, j), lij = max{lij−1, li−1j + vij − cj}, where l0j is understood to be zero. Clearly, in any
feasible solution, we have lij ≥ max{lij−1, li−1j+vij−cj} ∀i; ∀j because otherwise either
(2.15) or (2.16) cannot hold. Assume l∗ is an optimal solution containing some l∗ij values
such that l∗ij > max{l∗ij−1, l∗i−1j + vij − cj}. Let ĵ = arg min{j | l∗ij > max{l∗ij−1, l∗i−1j +




i−1ĵ + viĵ − cĵ}}. Clearly, (̂i, ĵ) 6= (I, J)
because otherwise we can get a better solution l∗′IJ = max{l∗IJ−1, l∗I−1J + vIJ − cJ} < l∗IJ
without violating any of the constraints. If we create a new solution l̂ such that l̂ij =
l∗ij ∀(i, j) 6= (̂i, ĵ) and l̂̂iĵ = max{l̂̂iĵ−1, l̂̂i−1ĵ + vîĵ − cĵ} = max{l∗îĵ−1, l
∗
ˆi−1ĵ + vîĵ − cĵ}, we
argue that l̂ is also feasible. Changing l∗
îĵ
to l̂̂iĵ only affects four constraints: (1) l̂̂iĵ ≥ l∗îĵ−1;
(2) l̂̂iĵ ≥ l∗î−1ĵ + vîĵ − cĵ; (3) l
∗
îĵ+1
≥ l̂̂iĵ; and (4) l∗î+1ĵ ≥ l̂̂iĵ + vî+1ĵ − cĵ . Clearly, the
first two inequalities still hold because of the definition of l̂̂iĵ . The last two inequalities
also hold because the left-hand-side values of both are not changed and the right-hand-
side values are reduced. Since the objective value lIJ is not affected, l̂ is also an optimal
solution. By using the same procedure, we can sequentially update all l∗ij values such that
l∗ij > max{l∗ij−1, l∗i−1j + vij − cj} to l∗
′
ij = max{l∗ij−1, l∗i−1j + vij − cj} while maintaining
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the optimality of the solution. Finally, we can obtain an optimal solution in which for each
(i, j), lij = max{lij−1, li−1j + vij − cj}.
Now we illustrate how to use lij = max{lij−1, li−1j+vij−cj} to quickly find out the
optimal solution. we start with i = 0: l0j = max{l0j−1, 0} = max{max{l0j−2, 0}, 0} =
. . . = 0. Next, we have l10 = max{0, l00 + v10 − c0} = 0. If l1j−1 is known, then we
can calculate l1j = max{l1j−1, l0j + v1j − cj}. Thus, we can calculate l1j ∀j in J + 1
step. Sequentially, we can calculate l2j, . . . , lIj and finally reach lIJ in (I+1)(J+1) steps.
Therefore, the computational complexity for CBP2d is O(IJ).
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I. Proof of Corollary 2.2.4
Proof Let c′ and c′′ be two (non-decreasing) cost vectors such that, for any j ≥ 1, c′j −
c′j−1 ≤ c′′j − c′′j−1. Let x′ be optimal with c′. For c′′, we construct an optimal allocation,
s, where consumers purchase bundles of weakly decreasing size compared to x′. Assume,














































































































































where the first inequality is by optimality of x′ with cost c′ and the optimality of x′′ with
cost c′′ and the second inequality follows sij + tij = x′ij +x
′′
ij and rearrangement inequality
because c′j−c′j−1 ≤ c′′j−c′′j−1,
∑J























. Therefore, equality holds throughout. Since x′ and x′′ are
optimal with c′ and c′′ respectively, s is a feasible allocation which yields optimal profit to



















it follows that s allocates smaller bundle sizes to all consumers compared to x′. Similarly,
for every optimal allocation x′′ with c′′, there exists an optimal allocation t with c′ where
each consumer buys a bundle of size at least as large as in x′′.









ij′ = 1, then the second inequality in (I.2) is strict and yields a contradiction.
Therefore, if the marginal cost of selling an additional unit (from j − 1 to j) with c′ is
strictly smaller than that with c′′, then no consumer purchases a bundle size less than j
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with c′ but at least j with c′′. If, for all j ≥ 1, c′j − c′j−1 < c′′j − c′′j−1, then with c′ no
consumer purchases a bundle size smaller than with c′′. Or, in every optimal solution with
c′ consumers purchase a bundle size smaller than in any optimal solution with c′′.
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J. Proof of Proposition 2.2.8
Proof Letw be an arbitrary set of WTPs satisfying SCP and v be a set of the corresponding
vij values. Consider w′ = W(i′, I, w), wherein WTPs of consumers indexed i′ through I
are homogenized. Then, the corresponding v′ij values of w
′ can be written as:
v′ij =

vij if i ≤ i′ − 2
(I − i′ + 2)wi′−1j −
∑I





i′′=i′ wi′′j if i ≥ i′.
Call the CBP problem with WTPs w as CBP (w) and that with w′ as CBP (w′). Let
j(i) denote the bundle size that Consumer i purchases in an optimal solution of CBP (w).
Consider an allocation j′(i) such that j′(i) = j(i) when i < i′ and j′(i) = J when i ≥ i′.
Obviously, j′(i) is a feasible bundle allocation for CBP (w′). We next show that j′(i) in
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ij′(i) that is weakly higher than
∑I
i=1 vij(i), the optimal















































vij(i) + (I − i′ + 2)wi′−1,j(i′−1) +
I∑
i=i′





wherein the equalities are because of either reorganization or by invoking the definitions;
the first inequality is because wiJ ≥ wij(i) ∀i; and the second inequality is due to SCP.
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K. Proof of Proposition 2.2.9
Proof From Equation (2.17), wij =
∑I
i′=i vi′j . We only need to fix vIj for all j to define
the WTPs, wij for all i and j. We will show that for large enough vIj , the corresponding
WTPs are non-decreasing in j and satisfy SCP. Observe that:
wij+1 − wij =
1




Therefore, w1j+1 − w1j ≥ 0 is equivalent to vIj+1 − vIj ≥ −
∑I−1
i′=1(vi′j+1 − vi′j). We
define v̄j+1 =
∑I−1
i′=1(vi′j+1 − vi′j). Further, in order that w satisfy SCP, we require that
















We define v′j+1 = maxi
{




. Then, we may
define vIj =
∑j
j′=1 max{v̄j, v′j} to ensure that WTPs satisfy SCP and are non-decreasing
in j.
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L. Proof of Lemma 2.3.2
Proof To show that S ′ = conv(S), we show that vert(S ′) ⊆ S ⊆ S ′, where vert(S ′) are
the vertices of S ′. Then, the result follows because S ′ is bounded, conv(S ′) = conv(vert(S ′)) ⊆
conv(S) ⊆ conv(S ′) = S ′, and conv(S ′) = S ′. We first show that S ⊆ S ′. Let (y′, x′) ∈ S.
Then, y′ satisfies (2.22) and x′ is as defined in (2.26). We show that (y′, x′) ∈ S ′. For that,








i+1j for all j. Let j1 be such that kj1 ≤ y′i ≤








ij . For j > j1 + 1,∑J
j′=j x
′




i+1j . Therefore, we only need to consider j = j1 + 1. Then,































Now, we show that vert(S ′) ⊆ S. Let (y′, x′) ∈ vert(S ′). Obviously, x′ ∈ vert(projx(S ′)).
However, by Proposition 2.2.6, the constraint matrix defining projx(S ′) is totally unimod-
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ular. Therefore, x′ is binary-valued. Then, it follows from
∑J
j=0 xij = 1 that xijxij′ = 0



































We now show that projy(S ′) = projy(S) = A. Towards this end, we prove that
projy(S) ⊆ A. Let (y, x) ∈ S. It follows that 0 ≤ yi ≤ Y because 0 = k0
∑J
j=0 xij ≤∑J
j=0 kjxij ≤ kJ
∑J
j=0 xij = Y . Also, yi ≤ yi+1 follows directly from
∑J
j=0 kjxij ≤∑J
j=0 kjxi+1j . SinceA ⊆ projy(S) follows directly from (2.26), it follows that projy(S) =
A. Then, projy(S ′) = A follows from
projy(S
′) = projy(conv(S)) = conv(projy(S)) = conv(A) = A,
where the second equality because a linear transformation commutes with convexification,
the third equality because projy(S) = A and the last equality because A is convex. The
last statement in the lemma follows from conv(projx(S)) = projx(conv(S)) = projx(S ′).
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M. Proof of Theorem 2.3.5
Proof We first show that Πk ≤ Πc. Define wij = wki (kj), cj = ck(kj), and vij = wij −
(I − i)(wi+1j − wij). Then, we solve CBP2 to find Πk and the optimal solution xij for
all i, j. The prices pj are assumed to satisfy Proposition 2.2.3. Now, for any y′ ∈ [0, Y ],
define p′(y′) = min{p(kj) | kj ≥ y′, j = 0, . . . , J}. Observe that since y ≤ Y = kJ ,
the minimum in the formula is attained. Let yi =
∑J
j=0 kjxij . We claim that (y, p
′) is
feasible to CBPc1 and has an objective value of Πk. Consider Constraints (3.33). Let




(wij − pj)xij ≥ wij′ − pj′ = wi(kj′)− p′(kj′) ≥ wi(y)− p′(y).








(pj − cj)xij = Πk.
Since (y, p′) is feasible to CBPc1 and has an objective value of Πk, it follows that the
optimal value Πc to CBPc1 is at least Πk.
Now, we show that Πc ≤ Πk + ε. Let (y′, p′) be the optimal assignment and price
for CBPc1. Now consider CBPc1 where the wi(·) and c(·) functions are replaced with
wki (·) and ck(·) and call this problem Q. Since wki (·) and ck(·) are piecewise-linear with
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breakpoints in {k1, . . . , kJ}, it follows from Theorem 2.3.3 that the optimal value of Q is
Πk. Now, we define p′′(y) = min{p(y′i)− iδ | y′i ≥ y, i = 0, . . . , I+ 1}, where y′0 and y′I+1
are assumed to be 0 and Y respectively and δ will be fixed later. Assume p′′(·) is the price
in Q. We show that there is a feasible solution (y′′, p′′) to Q, where y′′i ∈ {y′1, . . . , y′I} for
each i. Instead, let yi be an allocation to Consumer i such that y′i′−1 < yi < y
′
i′ . However,
wki (yi)− p′′(yi) ≤ wki (y′i′)− p′′(y′i′),
where the inequality follows since yi < y′i′ implies that w
k
i (yi) ≤ wki (y′i′) and the definition
of p′′(·) implies that p′′(yi) = p′′(y′i′). Therefore, the consumer may substitute y′i′ for
yi without loss of surplus. Now, observe that the choice set of each consumer is finite,
therefore there exists a bundle size that provides maximum surplus to the consumer. Now,
we show that, by suitably choosing δ, we can ensure that there exists a feasible solution





i. First, observe that Lipschitz continuity of wi(·) and c(·) guarantees that for
any y,
|wi(y)− wki (y)| ≤ max{wki (kj+1)− wi(y), wi(y)− wki (kj)}
= max{wi(kj+1)− wi(y), wi(y)− wi(kj)} ≤ kβ
(M.1)
|c(y)− ck(y)| ≤ max{|c(y)− ck(kj)|, |ck(kj+1)− c(y)|}
= max{|c(y)− c(kj)|, |c(kj+1)− c(y)|} ≤ kβ,
(M.2)
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where j is chosen such that kj ≤ y < kj+1. The first inequality follows since wk is non-
decreasing and the first equality because wi(·) (resp. c(·)) match wk(·) (resp. ck(·)) at all
y ∈ {k1, . . . , kJ}. Then, choosing δ = 2kβ it follows that:
wki (y
′
i′)− p′′(y′i′) = wki (y′i′)− (p(y′i′)− i′δ) ≤ wi(y′i′) + kβ − (p(y′i′)− i′δ)
≤ wi(y′i) + kβ − (p(y′i)− i′δ) ≤ wki (y′i) + 2kβ − (p(y′i)− i′δ)
≤ wki (y′i) + 2kβ − (i− i′)δ − (p(y′i)− iδ) ≤ wki (y′i)− p′′(y′i).
Therefore, no consumer purchases a smaller sized bundle and so, for any i′ > i:
p′′(y′i′)−ck(y′i′) ≥ p(y′i′)−c(y′i′)−i′δ−kβ ≥ p(yi)−c(yi)−i′δ−kβ ≥ p(yi)−c(yi)−(2I+1)kβ,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of p′′ and (M.2) and the second in-
equality from Proposition 2.2.3 and i′ > i, and the third inequality because δ = 2kβ.
Therefore,
Πk ≥ Πc − I(2I + 1)kβ = Πc − ε.
Because J = dY
k
e and CBP2 can be solved in O(IJ) time, CBPc1 can be approximated








N. Proof of Theorem 3.2.1
Proof According to Proposition 7 in [9], we prove that we can reformulate the MINLP








∣∣∣∣∣ (3.2), (3.4), (3.7)
}
.
We add the following χ variables to CBP2 and reformulate the problem into CBP3:
χ00j = x1j∀j, χijj′ = xijxi+1,j′1 ≤ i < I ∀j ∀j′ ≥ j, and χIjJ = xIj∀j.
(N.1)
We show that constraints of CBP3 are implied by CBP2 and (N.1). Constraints
(3.10), (3.12), and (3.15) follow from (N.1) and (3.4). Constraint (3.9) holds since
∑J
j=0 χ00j =∑J





j=0 xIj = 1, where the equalities are due to (N.1) and


































imply that equality holds throughout. In both cases, the first equality holds because (3.4)
and (3.2) imply that x2ij = xij and xijxij′ = 0 if j
′ 6= j. The first inequality follows from
(3.7) (and (3.2) in the second case), the second and third equalities from (N.1), the second
inequality from (3.4) and the last equality from (3.2).
Now, we show that Constraints (3.9)-(3.15) imply constraints of CBP2. We use




j=0 x00j = 1. For
the induction step, we assume
∑J
j=0 xij = 1 and show
∑J

















where the first equality follows from (3.14), the third equality by (3.13), and the last equal-




















xi−1j2 , where the first equality
follows from (3.14), the first inequality since some terms are dropped, and the last equal-
ity from (3.13). Constraint (3.4) follows since xij is non-negative and integer-valued by
Constraints (3.15) and (3.13) and it cannot take a value larger than one by (3.2).
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O. Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
Proof Define fi(z) =
∑J
j′=1 zij′ and f(z) = (f1(z), . . . , fI(z)). For z
′ and z′′ feasible to
CBPg,
C(z′) + C(z′′) = C ′(f(z′)) + C ′(f(z′′))
≥ C ′(max{f1(z′), f1(z′′)}, . . . ,max{fI(z′), fI(z′′)})
+ C ′(min{f1(z′), f1(z′′)}, . . . ,min{fI(z′), fI(z′′)})
= C(z′ ∨ z′′) + C(z′ ∧ z′′), (O.1)
since C ′ is submodular.
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P. Proof of Theorem 3.4.1
Proof It follows from (49.25) in [10] that a supermodular function can be maximized over
a lattice family in strongly polynomial time if the following two conditions hold. First, there
is an oracle to compute the supermodular function in strongly polynomial time. This is true
by assumption. Second, the lattice family C̆ is described using the smallest set, the largest
set and a pre-order  such that if u  v ⇔ each U ∈ C̆ containing v also contains u. For
us, the smallest element corresponds to the case when all consumers purchase nothing, i.e.,
zij = 0 for all j ≥ 1. The largest element is when all consumers purchase bundle size J ,
i.e., zij = 1 for all j ≤ J . For the pre-order , observe that if zij = 1, then zi′j′ = 1 for
all i′ ≥ i and j′ ≤ j and for all i′ if j′ = 0. In other words, (i′, j′)  (i, j) if and only if
either i′ ≥ i and j′ ≤ j or j′ = 0. If zij = 1 then zi′j′ = 1 using Constraints (3.29), (3.30),
and (3.31). Now, consider (i′, j′) 6 (i, j). Then, we show that there is a feasible allocation
that sets zi′j′ = 0 but zij = 1. From the definition of the pre-order, we know that j′ > 0
and either i′ < i or j′ > j. In either case, the sought solution is one where Consumers
1, . . . , i− 1 purchase nothing and Consumers i, . . . , I purchase Bundle j.
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Q. Proof of Corollary 3.4.2
Proof The two results follow from Lemma 2.8.1 and Theorem 2.8.4 in [13] respectively.
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R. Proof of Lemma 3.4.3
Proof We prove by induction on r. Consider y0. Since y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yI , it follows that
a(y1) ≤ · · · ≤ a(yI). Now, assume that yr−1 is feasible to CBPgcy. We show that
ari ≤ ari+1 for i ≤ I − 1. The inequality holds by induction whenever i 6∈ {π(r), π(r)− 1}
because ari′ = a
r−1
i′ for all i





π(r), where the first inequality follows from induction. Now, consider
i = π(r). Assume π−1(i + 1) < π−1(i) = r. Then, ari+1 = a
0
i+1 + 1 ≥ a0i + 1 = arr,
where the inequality follows by the base case. Now, assume that π−1(i+ 1) > π−1(i) = r.
Then, a0i ≤ a0i+1 because yi ≤ yi+1. If a0i < a0i+1, the result follows since ari+1 = a0i+1 and
ari = a
0
i + 1. We show that a
0
i cannot equal a
0
i+1. Otherwise, a(yi+1) = a(yi) and yi+1 ≥ yi
yield g(yi+1) ≥ g(yi) and thus a contradiction to π−1(i + 1) > π−1(i) using the definition
of π.
101
S. Proof of Theorem 3.4.4
Proof We describe the architecture of the proof. We construct a relaxation of CBPgcy,
which we call CBPgcyR. Then, we relax CBPgcyR to CBPgczR which has the same
objective value as CBPgcz. This shows that the objective value of CBPgcy is no more
than that of CBPgcz. Finally, we show the converse and recover the optimal solution y∗ of


















Observe that CBPgcyR is a relaxation of CBPgcy, because C ′′(y) ≤ C ′(y) and, therefore,




1 if j ≤ a(yi)







k(j) − k(j − 1)
)












For all j, define wij = wi(k(j)) and, as before, vij = wij − (I − i)(wi+1j − wij), where
wI+1j is assumed to be wIj . Then, vi(yi) =
∑J
j=0 vij(zij − zij+1).
Now, consider CBPgcz, where we replace (3.32) with 0 ≤ zij ≤ 1, call the re-
sulting feasible region R, and extend C(z) over all of R. Observe that, as in the proof of
Proposition 3.4.2, C(·) restricted to binary vertices is submodular.
To extendC(z) toR, we construct the convex envelope ofC(z) restricted to Feas(CBPgcz)
over R. For any z ∈ R, let γz(·, ·) : {1, . . . , I} × {1, . . . , J} → {1, . . . , IJ} be a one-
to-one mapping such that γz(i, j) ≥ γz(i′, j′) whenever zi,j ≤ zi′,j′ . In addition, we re-
quire that ties such as zi,j = zi′,j′ are resolved in the following manner. If i′ > i then
γz(i, j) > γz(i
′, j′). Otherwise, if i′ = i and j′ < j then γz(i, j) > γz(i′, j′). Observe that
this definition guarantees that γz(i + 1, j) < γz(i, j) and γz(i, j − 1) < γz(i, j). Let z0
be defined such that zi0 = 1 for all i, and zij = 0 otherwise. For r = 1, . . . , IJ , define
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zr = z0 +
∑r
s=1 e
γ−1z (s). Observe that, for all r, zr is feasible to CBPgcz, because of the
definition of γz. Then, using the insight from Corollary 2.3 in [16], we extend
















vij(zij − zij+1)− C̆(z)
s.t. (3.29), (3.30), (3.31)
0 ≤ zij ≤ 1 ∀i; ∀j (S.4)
is a relaxation of CBPgcz. We now show that CBPgczR is also a relaxation of CBPgcyR.
We begin by showing that for each y ∈ Feas(CBPgcy), if z is defined as in (S.2), then
C̆(z) = C ′′(y). The result is clear if y ∈ {k(0), . . . , k(J)}I since in this case, C̆(z) =
C(z) = C ′(y) = C ′(y0) = C ′′(y), where the first equality follows since z is a vertex of
R, the second equality because of the definition of C(z), and the third equality because
y0 = y. Since g(y0) = 1 and g(yi) = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ I , the last equality follows.
When, y 6∈ {k(0), . . . , k(J)}I , we define zij as in (S.2). Let I ′ ⊆ {1, . . . , I} be the set
of consumers for which g(yi) 6∈ {0, 1}, i.e., yi 6∈ {k(0), . . . , k(J)}. It follows from the
definition of γ that for any i, i′ ∈ I ′, γz(i, a(yi) + 1) ≥ γz(i′, a(yi′) + 1) if and only
if (i) g(yi) < g(yi′), or (ii) g(yi) = g(yi′) and i < i′. However, this implies that for
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i ∈ I ′, the relative ordering of γz(i, a(yi) + 1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ I is consistent with π−1(i).
Let t be the smallest value such that zγ−1(t) 6∈ {0, 1}. Then, it follows that for i ∈ I ′,
γ(i, a(yi) + 1) = π
−1(i) + t − 1. Since, for r = 0, . . . , |I ′|, yr ∈ {k(0), . . . , k(J)}I ,
it follows from the discussion above that C(zr+t−1) = C ′(yr) for r = 0, . . . , |I ′|. Let
zγ−1z (I+1) = 0 and observe that












zγ−1z (r) − zγ−1z (r+1)
)
C(zr)




















C ′(yr) = C ′′(y),
where the first equality is from (S.3) and that zγ−1z (r) = 0 for r ≥ t+|I
′|; the second follows
by rearranging terms and because the definition of I ′ implies that zγ−1z (t+|I′|) = 0; the third
is by realizing that zγ−1z (r) = g(yπ(r−t+1)) for r = t, . . . , t+|I
′|−1 and C(zr) = C ′(yr−t+1)
for r = t − 1, . . . , t + |I ′| − 1; the fourth is because g(yπ(0)) = 1 and g(yπ(I+1)) = 0; the
fifth is because the terms in the summation with r > |I ′| are zero; and the final is by (S.1).
Thus, we have shown that, for any y ∈ Feas(CBPgcy), if z is defined as in (S.2), then
C̆(z) = C ′′(y) ≤ C ′(y). Finally, observe that we already showed that piecewise-linearity
of wi(·) implies that vi(yi) =
∑J
j=0 vij(zij − zij+1).
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We have thus shown CBPgczR is a relaxation of CBPgcy. Now, we show that
there exists an optimal solution in CBPgczR where each zij is binary. Assume that this
is not the case. Now, take an optimal solution z̄, compute the corresponding γz̄(i, j) map-








= z̄ij . First ob-
serve that all terms in the summation, except when r = γz̄(i, j), are zero since z̄rij =
z̄r−1ij otherwise. When r = γz̄(i, j), the term yields z̄ij because z̄
r
ij = 1 and z̄
r−1
ij =













j=0 vij(zij − zij+1) −
C̆(z) be the objective function of CBPgczR and note that we have shown that there exist
λ0, . . . , λIJ , each non-negative, such that
∑IJ




In particular, λ0 = (1− z̄γz̄(1)); λr = (z̄γz̄(r) − z̄γz̄(r+1)) for r = 1, . . . , IJ − 1; and λIJ =





r=0 λr maxr′ F (z̄
r′) = maxr′ F (z̄
r′), i.e.,
there exists one of z̄0, . . . , z̄IJ , say zr, that achieves the same objective function value as
z̄. Since z̄r is feasible to CBPgcz with the same objective value as in CBPgczR, it follows
that the optimal value of CBPgcz matches that of CBPgczR.
We showed that the optimal value of CBPgcy is no more than that of CBPgcz.
We now show the converse. Consider z′ feasible to CBPgcz and let yi =
∑J
j=1(k(j) −
k(j−1))zij . By definition ofC(·) and piecewise-linearity ofwi(·), y has the same objective
function value in CBPgcy as does z in CBPgcz. Further, y is feasible to CBPgcy. Observe
that, y satisfies (3.34) because yi =
∑J
j=1(k(j) − k(j − 1))zij ≤
∑J
j=1(k(j) − k(j −
1))zi+1j = yi+1, because k(j) > k(j − 1) and zi+1j ≥ zij . Also, y satisfies (3.35) because
0 ≤
∑J
j=1(k(j)− k(j − 1))zij ≤
∑J
j=1(k(j)− k(j − 1)) = k(J)− k(0) = Y .
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T. Proof of Corollary 3.4.6






C ′(yr) then the result follows from Theo-







1. Therefore, it follows from (3.36) that y ∈ conv(y0, . . . , yI). By Lemma 3.4.3, y0, . . . , yI







C ′(·) is concave.
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U. Proof of Theorem 3.4.7
Proof Assume y′ is the optimal solution to CBPgcy. Let {i1, . . . , ik} be the lowest-type
consumers that purchase a bundle of a certain size. The pricing p then follows from Propo-
sition 7 in [9]:







More formally, for any s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ Y , define r′(s) = arg minr{ir | y′ir ≥ ys}, i.e.,
the lowest-type consumer who purchases a bundle of larger size. If there is no consumer
that purchases a bundle of size s or larger, we define its price to be wIY + δ for some δ > 0.











We denote CBPgcy with WTPs replaced with wk(·) and cost replaced with C ′k(y)
as Problem T. We now construct a feasible solution to T by providing a pricing strategy such
that, for all i, Consumer i still purchases y′i. For this we again utilize (U.1). For bundle












. It follows from Proposition
7 in [9] that Consumer i continues to purchase bundle size y′i in Problem T. For any s
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satisfying 0 ≤ s ≤ Y , let sk = max{k(j) | k(j) ≤ s} and s′k = min{k(j) | k(j) ≥ s}.
Then, for any i:
|wki (s)− wi(s)| = |wki (s)− wki (sk) + wi(sk)− wi(s)|
≤ max{wki (s)− wki (sk), wi(s)− wi(sk)}






where the first equality follows because wki (sk) = wi(sk); the first inequality because
wki (s) − wki (sk) ≥ 0 and wi(sk) − wi(s) ≤ 0; the second inequality because wki (s′k) ≥
wki (s) ≥ wki (sk); the second equality because wki (s′k) = wi(s′k), wki (sk) = wi(sk) and
wi(s
′
k) ≥ wi(s) ≥ wi(sk); and the last inequality because of Lipschitz continuity of w.
Observe that




































where the last inequality follows from (U.2). Consider a vector y feasible to CBPgcy
and construct y0, . . . yI as described before Lemma 3.4.3. Let t1 = arg min{C ′(t) | t ∈
{y0, . . . , yI}} and t2 = arg max{C ′(t) | t ∈ {y0, . . . , yI}}. Then:
|C ′k(y)− C ′(y)| = |C ′k(y)− C ′k(t1) + C ′i(t1)− C ′(s)|
≤ |C ′k(y)− C ′k(t1)|+ |C ′(t1)− C ′(y)|
≤ |C ′k(t2)− C ′k(t1)|+ |C ′(t1)− C ′(y)|





where the second inequality follows from (3.36) and sinceC ′k is linear in conv{y0, . . . , yI},
the second equality follows since C ′k(·) matches C ′(·) at each of {y0, . . . , yI}, and the
last inequality follows because ‖t2 − t1‖ ≤
√
Ik and ‖y − t1‖ ≤
√
Ik. Therefore,
Πk ≥ Πc − 2kβ(I2 +
√




, Πk ≥ Πc + ε. Since the optimal so-
lution of T occurs at the breakpoints, it is also feasible to CBPgcy, as long as the price
of the intermediate sizes is set high enough (to that of the next breakpoint). Therefore,
Πk ≤ Πc.
Finally, observe that, by Theorem 3.4.1, CBPgcz can be solved in time polynomial
in I and J and the oracle time to compute C ′(y). Then, the algorithm is polynomial in I ,
Y , β, 1
ε
because J = dY
k
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